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Summary
This dissertation is concerned with theory and behavior in stopping problems.
In a stopping problem an agent or individual observes the realization of some
exogenous and stationary stochastic process over time. At every point in time,
she has the right or the once-only option to stop the process in order to earn
a function of the past and current values of the process. The agent’s objective
then is to choose the point in time to exercise the option in order to maximize an
expected reward or to minimize an expected loss. Such problems constitute the
most rudimentary, yet truly dynamic class of choice problems that is studied in
economics.
More formally, let time be discrete t = 1, 2, . . . and denote by X = (X1, X2, . . .)
a sequence of random variables which we will refer to as the payoff or offer process
the agent faces. In the first two chapters, we will assume that the probability law
which generates realizations of these random variables is known. The third chapter
will weaken this assumption. Associated with a given sequence of realizations
X̂ = (X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . .) of X, which we will sometimes refer to as a path of
X, is a sequence of real-valued earnings or consequences from stopping V (X̂) =
(v1(X1 = x1), v2(X1 = x1, X2 = x2), . . .). After observing the first t realizations
(X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = xt), the agent may decide to stop and earn v(X1 =
x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = xt) or to continue and observe Xt+1 and face the same
decision again. Here vt may be any real-valued function of X. For example,
suppose the payoff from stopping in period t is the current value Xt = xt, then vt
could be a standard Bernoulli utility vt(X1 = x1, . . . , Xt = xt) = u(xt). Similarly,
suppose the payoff from stopping in period t is the sum of all future payoffs, e.g.
when investing into a widget that generates profits once installed, then vt may be
a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functional E[
∑T
s=t u(Xs) | X̂].
Under mild regularity conditions (see e.g. Chow, Robbins & Siegmund, 1971), an
optimal stopping rule exists and may be found based on Bellman’s Principle of Op-
timality. That is, instead of finding the optimal rule for the multi-period problem,
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i.e. the whole path of X, the optimization problem is reduced to the subproblem
of choosing between stopping and continuation at each point in time. Hence, the
optimal rule may be found by choosing for every t between the immediate gains
from stopping v(X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = xt), and the expected future gains
given that the agent behaves optimally for all future Xt. For finite-horizon prob-
lems, this amounts to applying backward induction, whereas in stopping problems
with unknown or infinite horizon, recursive dynamic programming can be used to
derive the optimal rule.
Historically, stopping problems of this form first occurred in statistical decision
theory (see Wald, 1945a; Arrow, Blackwell & Girshick, 1948) and were further
laid out in the subsequent books by Abraham Wald: Sequential Analysis in 1947
and Statistical Decision Functions in 1950.
A key example for an application of stopping problems to economics is job
search. Job seekers can be thought to face a stopping problem, as they sequentially
receive wage offers over time and have the option to accept the current offer or to
reject it in favor of future offers (Stigler, 1962; McCall, 1970; Rogerson, Shimer &
Wright, 2005). Based on the work by e.g. Diamond (1982), stopping theory has
formed a crucial building block in the development of modern labor market models
(Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994, 1999). Further applications arise in many other
fields. In finance holders of an American call or put options can be thought to face
a stopping problem, because they have the right to exercise, i.e. buy or sell, the
underlying asset at a fixed price any time before some maturity date (Jacka, 1991).
Similarly, firms that face a market-entry decision or an irreversible investment or
liquidation decision also can be thought to face a stopping problem (McDonald &
Siegel, 1986a; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994a). Stopping problems, however, also occur
in more mundane or every-day situations. Examples are the buying or selling of
a house or renting an apartment, searching for the best price for a new TV or
deciding to go for a Ph.D. degree or not.
Given their widespread application to economic theory and their frequent occur-
rence in every-day life, stopping problems are of considerable interest. While the
theoretical literature on optimal stopping is vast, little is known about whether
the theoretical models of behavior describe actual behavior in stopping problems
well or at least provide a pertinent approximation. Moreover, even though the
theoretical literature on optimal stopping problems is very advanced, it is almost
exclusively concerned with the case where the objective function of the expected
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utility (EU) type. While EU is the leading normative theory of behavior in eco-
nomics, it is frequently found to be descriptively deficient.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, we therefore revisit the theoretical back-
drop and provide new theoretical results about optimal stopping both under EU
and two prominent behavioral theories: Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory
preferences without probability weighting and Loomes & Sugden’s regret prefer-
ences. Under EU it is a well-known result that the optimal rule is simple: Stop as
soon as the payoff process attains a certain reservation level. Otherwise wait. Our
first contribution is to show that this indeed holds under a very general notion
of EU. The way we generalize this result relative to the literature, is by relax-
ing a standard monotonicity assumption to a single-crossing assumption on the
Bernoulli utility function of an agent. While our single-crossing assumption holds
for any strictly increasing and concave utility, the monotonicity assumption does,
e.g., not necessarily hold under constant absolute risk aversion. However, the gain
from relaxing the classical assumption on utility is more substantial.
First, utility need not be concave, but can be neither concave nor differentiable
under our assumption. This allows us to extend our results to value functions
or gain-loss utility (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979a).1 Our work relates to several
recent papers recent theoretical papers that are concerned with optimal stop-
ping rules under behavioral preferences. For example, Barberis & Xiong (2009,
2012); Henderson (2012); Ebert & Strack (2012); Xu & Zhou (2013) apply or de-
rive optimal stopping rules for an agent with gain-loss preferences or cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) preferences – the leading positive theory of choice under
uncertainty. However, in dynamic settings the application of prospect theory and
gain-loss utility remains a delicate issue and especially in combination with prob-
ability weighting is found to easily run into conceptual and theoretical problems
or not to yield behaviorally different predictions than EU (see e.g. Hens & Vlcek,
2011; Ebert & Strack, 2012). And in fact, we show that in the classical setting we
consider, gain-loss preferences do not yield behaviorally different predictions than
EU.
Second, under the single-crossing assumption we show that cut-off strategies
1We will use the term value function and gain-loss utility synonymously to describe an agent
whose utility is defined over final wealth relative to a fixed and known reference point, e.g.
the famous S-shaped utility. To avoid confusion with the term value function found in the
dynamic programming literature, we will henceforth use the term gain-loss utility. We do
not consider probability distortion of any sort here (see Ebert & Strack, 2012; Xu & Zhou,
2013, for results with probability distortion).
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are not only optimal for a larger class of utility functions, but also if one considers
off-equilibrium optimal strategies, i.e. subgame perfect strategies. That is, the
optimal strategy of an EU agent and an agent with gain-loss utility is robust to
erroneous deviations. Even if the agent reaches a point she never planned to reach
ex ante, she will not reconsider her subsequent plan.
We show this is different under regret. Regret preferences as we will understand
them here were introduced by Loomes & Sugden (1982) in a static one-shot set-
ting.2 While much attention has been devoted to the impact of regret on decision
making in the psychology (Gilovich, Medvec & Kahneman, 1998; Zeelenberg, van
Dijk, Van der Pligt, Manstead, Van Empelen & Reinderman, 1998; Zeelenberg,
Van Dijk, Manstead & vanr de Pligt, 2000; Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen & Wil-
son, 2004) and neuroscience literature (Camille, Coricelli, Sallet, Pradat-Diehl,
Duhamel & Sirigu, 2004; Coricelli, Critchley, Joffily, O’Doherty, Sirigu & Dolan,
2005; Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 2007), the choice theoretic literature that investi-
gates the theoretical prediction under regret – especially in a dynamic context – is
still fairly infant.3 To the best of our knowledge the only papers that take regret
theory to a dynamic setting are due to Krähmer & Stone (2012) and Hayashi
(2009, 2011). While Krähmer & Stone (2012) treat the case of a finite-horizon
choice problem under regret à la Loomes & Sugden, Hayashi (2009, 2011) is con-
cerned with commitment and consistency issues in a finite-horizon stopping prob-
lem where the agent has minimax-regret preferences in the sense of Wald-Savage.
We show that regret preferences à la Loomes & Sugden do not yield behaviorally
different predictions in our setting, unless agents can unexpectedly deviate from
their ex-ante plan. That is, (i) the ex ante optimal stopping rule for a regret
2Wald (1945b) and Savage (1951) already delineated a model of decision making under regret,
often called (Savage’s) minimax regret or Wald’s maximin model, as a theory of distribution-
free decision making in statistics. Milnor (1954); Stoye (2011) provide an axiomatization.
Under minimax regret the decision maker is completely ignorant of any probabilities that
certain states of the world realize and his sole objective is to minimize his maximal regret.
This makes minimax regret optimization robust to model misspecification or misperception
of the relevant probabilities, by being entirely independent of it or – equivalently – by con-
sidering the optimal rule under every possible distribution (see e.g. Hansen & Sargent, 2001,
for a related literature in macroeconomics). A very much related robustification comes in
the form of the maximin expected utility model due to Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989).
3Nonetheless, there is a growing literature that considers the impact of emotions and counter-
factual thinking on choice behavior. For example, see Rabin (2004); Battigalli & Dufwenberg
(2007, 2009) or Bordalo, Gennaioli & Shleifer (2012). Examples for applications of minimax-
regret preferences to economics are Bergemann & Schlag (2011) who consider monopoly
pricing, Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay (2007) who consider auctions and Linhart & Radner (1989)
who consider bargaining under minimax-regret.
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is again a cut-off rule and (ii) in a setting where agents always implement their
period-0 optimal rule, regret cannot be distinguished from EU. In a setting where
agents can unexpectedly deviate from their initial plan, they become ex-post dis-
tinguishable from EU. In contrast to EU or gain-loss preferences, a regret agent
reconsiders the ex-ante plan in the light of past events and adapts her ex-ante
cut-off upward to the value of the past maximum of the payoff process. We call
this a disposition to gamble for resurrection.
In the second chapter, we attempt to test some of key implications derived in
the first chapter. Based on the setting that was considered there, we designed an
experiment which exactly replicates the theoretical setup. That is, we face subjects
in the laboratory with the option to stop a multiplicative binomial random walk.
Given our results from chapter one, we would expect subjects to (i) stop the
process at roughly the same reservation level over several repetitions of the same
stopping task and (ii) not to stop the process at a point they had seen before.
We present the task to subjects in a intuitive graphical representation, much like
a stock price on a ticker tape. Subjects observe 65 different random walks and
may stop each of the processes at any point in time to obtain a material payoff
of Xt − K, where K > 0 is known. Every process has a random duration, i.e.
at some unknown point in time, the process and the option to stop expires. We
find almost no evidence for cut-off behavior in our data, i.e. subjects do not
seem to play or converge to a unique reservation level and they behave time-
inconsistently most of the time. However, beginning with Mosteller & Nogee
(1951), individual subjects in experiments are found to exhibit frequent choice
switching between alternatives across identical trials. This quite immediately leads
one to consider a model of stochastic choice. In principle, most if not all deviations
from EU or any other structural model of choice can be explained by a random or
stochastic component. That is, while some choice switches may be explained by
the structural part representing preferences, the remainder is attributed to random
preferences, mistakes or unobservable characteristics. A stochastic choice model as
we model it here can be viewed as an econometric model of choice, where an agent
chooses the preferred action from a set of available actions not with certainty but
with a certain probability. This probability is a function of the utility that arises
from choosing the given action relative to all other actions (see Wilcox, 2008, for a
primer). In our setting, this means that choice depends on the difference between
the value from stopping and continuation at each point. Since our results from
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chapter one also hold in a setting where agents deviate from their ex-ante plan,
our expressions for the continuation and stopping value remain intact. This allows
us to translate our theoretical results into a structural econometric model without
any conceptual loss. Additionally, an agent’s choice is now affected by a random
component that is added to the difference between stopping and continuation
value. Different distributional assumptions about this error constitute different
choice models. For example, under the assumption that the composite error that
hits the utility difference is normally distributed, one speaks of a dynamic probit
model, whereas under a logistic distribution one understands the model to be a
dynamic version of the standard logit model. Fitting such a model to our data,
we not only accommodate for the stochastic component of it, but we may also
test the regret model against the EU model. And in fact, our results suggest that
a model including regret aversion fits the data substantially better. Intuitively,
this is explained by the fact that subjects in our sample seldom stop below the
past maximum of the process, i.e. are reluctant to realize a loss relative to past
maximum. The structural part of the regret model accommodates for this through
the prediction that agents will gamble for resurrection. Intuitively, the regret
model yields a better signal-to-noise ratio. It fits the data better, because it
can attribute more of the choice switches to its systematic or structural part, as
opposed to the unsystematic or stochastic part, than an EU model.
In the third and last chapter, we investigate stopping behavior in a setting,
where the probability law that drives the process Xt is not perfectly known to the
decision maker. Assuming perfect knowledge of the probabilities of future events
seems unrealistic in most (if not all) real-world contexts. Beginning with Becker
& Brownson (1964), the impact of ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes in individ-
ual decision making, as introduced by Ellsberg (1961), has been documented in
static one-shot choices in many experimental studies. While the impact of lack of
knowledge about probabilities is relatively well explored in static choices, less is
known about its impact in a dynamic setting. In this chapter, we investigate the
effect of ambiguity on behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. This has a
key advantage over studies that employ field data to test for such effects, since ev-
ery empirical analysis with field data will be inevitably marred by many potential
confounds. In the laboratory we are able to conduct a randomized control trial
and induce an exogenous variation that is orthogonal to any other effect. The
experimental results indicate that there exists a significant effect of uncertainty
xiii
and that this effect does not become insignificant over a fairly large number of
repetitions of the same stopping task. Subjects in the experiment who were ran-
domly assigned to a treatment group facing an ambiguous payoff process, invest,
on average, later than subjects assigned to a control group facing a risky process.
The experiment is designed in a way that under EU, those subjects facing an
ambiguous payoff process should in principle stop no later than subjects facing a
risky payoff process.
The experimental findings relate to several other literatures, e.g. the macroe-
conomic literature that is concerned with uncertainty effects à la Bloom (2009)
or the literature on market microstructure or investment behavior and portfolio
choice where agents are ambiguity averse (Epstein & Schneider, 2010). Finally,
they may also serve as microfoundation for macroeconomic models which model
representative household or firm behavior with recursive multiple-prior preferences
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1 Optimal Stopping rules under Expected Utility
and Regret
This chapter is based on joint work with Philipp Strack.
1.1. Introduction
We study choice behavior in the following setting: An agent observes a sequence of
offers, X = (X1, X2, . . .), which are the realizations of some stationary stochastic
process. After observing the t-th offer, the agent has to decide whether to continue
and thus forgo the current offer or to stop and seize it. In the former case, she
observes the next offer and faces the same decision again. In the latter case, the
agent’s decision to stop is irreversible and she receives a net payoff Xt −K from
which she derives utility u(Xt−K), where K > 0 is known a fixed. In considering
which stopping rule is optimal, the agent has to weigh the immediate gains from
stopping at Xt, against the loss of the option to stop at higher values in the future.
In this paper, we address the question of what do theories of dynamic behavior
predict people to do in stopping problems? That is, we extend existing and also
provide new results about optimal stopping rules under different preferences.
Stopping theory has been used to model many different decision-making con-
texts in finance, economics and statistics. Most prominently in economics, op-
timal stopping theory has been applied to model labor search frictions in (see
inter alia Stigler, 1962; McCall, 1970; Rogerson et al., 2005), but also to model
irreversible investment-, option pricing- and market entry decisions (McDonald &
Siegel, 1986b; Jacka, 1991; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994b) or the optimal sample size
for sequential hypothesis testing (Wald, 1945a). While stopping theory is widely
applied, the vast majority of the theoretical (let alone experimental) literature
almost exclusively considers agent with expected utility (EU) preferences.
It is a well-known result that under expected utility (EU), an agent bases her
1
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decision solely on the current state of Xt, irrespective of the history of events that
lead there. This is because an EU agent only cares about the distribution over
final wealth, which is solely a function of Xt. The optimal stopping rule turns out
to be simple: Stop as soon as the payoff process hits a certain reservation level.
Otherwise wait. This strategy, which we call a cut-off strategy, comprises two
important properties. First, it is a reservation-level strategy. That is, the agent
has a unique payoff reservation level that makes it optimal for her to seize the
option which is independent of the path of Xt that lead there. Second, the agent
behaves time-consistently, i.e. the process is stopped the first time it reaches this
reservation level.
Our first contribution is to show that this prediction holds under a very general
notion of EU. The way we generalize the notion of EU relative to the literature, is
by relaxing a standard monotonicity assumption to a single-crossing assumption
on the utility function of an agent. While the latter is always satisfied for both
CRRA and CARA utility functions for example, the former is not always satisfied
for CARA utility.
However, the gain from weakening this assumption is more substantial. First,
our resulting notion of expected utility is general enough to cover non-differentiable,
non-concave utility functions. This also nests gain-loss preferences à la Kahneman
& Tversky, where utility is defined over gains and losses relative to a fixed reference
point and agents are risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses. Several
papers have put forward Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory, adapted to a
dynamic context, is able to better explain observed behavior in stopping problems
(Barberis & Xiong, 2009; Henderson, 2012). Nonetheless, adaption of prospect
theory preferences to dynamic contexts remains a delicate issue and especially
in combination with probability weighting is found to run into conceptual and
theoretical problems when explaining deviations from EU (see e.g. Hens & Vlcek,
2011; Ebert & Strack, 2012). Second, armed with the single-crossing assumption,
we are not only able to establish that the ex-ante or minimal optimal strategy is
a cut-off strategy, we also show that the subgame perfect optimal strategy is a
unique cut-off strategy.
Our second contribution is to derive the optimal stopping rule for an agent with
minimax regret preferences. Regret and its anticipation in a dynamic context have
received considerable attention in the fields of psychology (Gilovich et al., 1998;
Zeelenberg et al., 1998, 2000) and more recently neuroscience (Camille et al., 2004;
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Coricelli et al., 2005, 2007) and already Shefrin & Statman (1985) conjectured it
to be an important factor in the related portfolio choice problem.1 We model a
regret agent as an agent whose utility is defined over final wealth relative to what
would have been ex post optimal (Wald, 1945b; Milnor, 1954; Stoye, 2011). In our
setting this implies a dynamic reference point at the past maximum of Xt. Our
first result is that even though regret preferences are time-inconsistent, the ex-ante
optimal strategy of such an agent is a cut-off strategy, i.e. time-consistent. Our
second result qualifies this finding in the sense that the subgame perfect optimal
strategy of a regret agent is not a cut-off strategy. Loosely speaking, if we consider
the possibility that agents may fail to implement their ex ante strategy, their ex
post behavior is predicted to be different. Specifically, agents with EU and gain-
loss preferences will behave time-consistently and not reconsider their behavior ex
post. We show that a regret agent, however, will reconsider her plan and likely
raise the ex-post cut-off to be equal to the past maximum of the payoff process.2
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, we give a brief overview over
the related literature. In section 1.3, we describe the choice setting we consider.
In section 1.4, we present our model of expected utility and regret and derive the
optimal strategy under both preferences and discuss testable predictions. Section
3.7 finally concludes.
1.2. Related Literature
Our paper relates to several strands in the literature. The theoretical literature
on optimal stopping is vast and too large to give an exhaustive overview here.
Peskir & Shiryaev (2006) provide an overview over the mathematical literature
on optimal stopping and free-boundary problems in discrete and continuous time,
whereas Dixit & Pindyck (1994b) provide an introduction of these mathematical
tools to the finance and economics literature. The theory of optimal stopping has
been applied to many different contexts in economics, most prominently to job
1Also Harry Markowitz admitted in an often-cited quote in the January issue of the magazine
Money in 1998 that his actual portfolio choice is largely dictated by anticipated regret: "I
should have computed the historical covariance of the asset classes and drawn an efficient
frontier. Instead I visualized my grief if the stock market went way up and I wasn’t in it –
or if it went way down and I was completely in it. My intention was to minimize my future
regret, so I split my [pension scheme] contributions 50/50 between bonds [risk-free assets]
and equities [risky assets]."
2This provides a formal proof for the conjecture made by Gneezy (2005) about the behavior of
an agent with reference point at the historical peak of the payoff process.
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search models (see inter alia Stigler, 1962; McCall, 1970; Rogerson et al., 2005),
but also to settings where firms face an irreversible investment or market-entry
decision (McDonald & Siegel, 1986b; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994b). More recently,
there has been growing interest in the implications of non-standard preferences for
optimal stopping rules or more generally dynamic behavior. For example, Epstein
& Schneider (2003); Nishimura & Ozaki (2007, 2004); Riedel (2009); Cheng &
Riedel (2013) derive optimal stopping rules under ambiguity, whereas Hens &
Vlcek (2011); Henderson (2012); Ebert & Strack (2012) consider settings where
an agent’s utility stems from realized gains and losses or the agent has prospect
theory preferences à la Kahneman & Tversky (1979b).
Interest has largely focused on prospect theory preferences in a dynamic con-
text, but there has been less interest in the impact of regret on stopping behavior.
However, regret or more generally the impact of emotion on choice is likely to
be an important building block in explaining prominent choice patterns such as
the disposition effect. For example, Summers & Duxbury (2007) provide exper-
imental evidence that the disposition effect does not appear if subjects are not
actively trading assets, but merely experience losses without being responsible
for them. Regret-based decision heuristics were introduced by Wald (1945b) and
axiomatized in a static context by Milnor (1954); Loomes & Sugden (1982). Kräh-
mer & Stone (2012) consider a multi-period model with finite horizon and show
that regret leads to path-dependent behavior. In our setting, the time horizon is
stochastic and only almost surely finite, which takes away any end-of-game effect
found by Krähmer & Stone. Hayashi (2009) also considers a finite-horizon setting
and focuses on dynamic consistency issues of a naïve regret agent and shows how
they can be resolved.
1.3. The Setting
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. The agent observes a sequence
X0, X1, . . . of realizations of a multiplicative binomial random walk. For a given
starting value X0 > 0, future values of Xt are drawn according to the transition
rule
Xt+1 =
hXt with probability p1
h
Xt with probability 1− p
.
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We call h > 1 the step size and p ∈ [0, 1] the uptick probability. We denote by
X = {hkX0 : k ∈ Z} the set off possible states of the process Xt. At the end of
any period t there is a fixed exogenous probability 1 − δ ∈ [0, 1] that the game
ends and the agent receives a payoff of zero. We denote by T ≥ 0 the random time
the game ends. At any time t < T before the game ended the agent observes the
realization of the random walk Xt and decides whether to ‘continue’ or to ‘stop’.
If the agent chooses to stop in period t, she receives the value of the random
walk Xt minus a constant transaction cost K > 0, such that her material pay-off
equals
Xt −K .
Without loss of generality we assume that K ≤ X0.3 After an agent decided
to stop, she continues to observe the realization of the process until the process
jumps to zero in period T .
If the agent chooses to continue, the game ends with probability 1− δ and the
agent gets a payoff of zero. With probability δ, the game does not end in period t,
but period t+ 1 starts and the agent observes the next realization of the random
walk Xt+1.
The expected gain from stopping in period t+ 1 instead of period t equals








+ (1− δ)K .
If δ(ph + (1 − p)h−1) ≥ 1 this gain in expected payoff positive for all x ∈ X and
an expected value maximizing agent never stops. This strategy however leads to
a payoff of zero and thus no optimal strategy exists. The following assumption
ensures that the expected value maximizing strategy is always well defined.
Assumption 1. To make sure the problem is well-posed for the risk-neutral agent,
we assume that δ(ph+ (1− p)h−1) < 1 .
1.4. Theories of Dynamic Behavior
In this section, we derive our theoretical predictions under different theories of dy-
namic behavior. The two broad classes of preferences we consider are (i) expected
utility and (ii) minimax regret preferences.
3Otherwise it is always optimal for the agent to at least wait until he reaches K or the game
ends.
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For each class, we describe the underlying model assumptions and derive key
properties about predicted behavior. It turns out that both theories predict that
agents will use simple strategies, i.e. cut-off strategies. A cut-off strategy, is a
strategy which satisfies the following definition
Definition 1 (Cut-off Strategy). The cut-off strategy τ(b) prescribes that the agent
stops at time t if the value of the process Xt exceeds the cut-off b and continues
otherwise. That is
τ(b) = min{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b} . (1.1)
It is worth to stress that a cut-off strategy comprises two important features.
First, it is a reservation level strategy, i.e. it says that there exists a unique
level at which it is optimal to stop for the agent. Second, it postulates that
the process is stopped the first time the process reaches this level. This second
property essentially is a time-consistency property. A strategy that satisfies both,
the reservation-level property and the time-consistency property is what we call
a cut-off strategy. A violation of the second property, i.e. stopping at a point
Xt with Xt < maxs≤tXs, indicates time-inconsistent behavior and cannot be
rationalized by expected utility. What is surprising, however, is that it is also not
rationalizable by certain classes of path-dependent preferences. We demonstrate
this for the case of regret preferences below.
1.4.1. Expected Utility
An expected utility agent evaluates outcomes according to the strictly increasing
(and not necessarily concave) utility function u : [−K,∞) → R. Denote by 1A
the indicator function that takes the value one on the event A and zero otherwise.
The EU agent then chooses the stopping time τ that maximizes
E
[
1{τ<T}u(Xτ −K) + 1{τ≥T}u(0) |X0 = x
]
. (1.2)
Because preferences over stopping times are invariant under additive translations
of the utility u, we can without loss of generality assume u(0) = 0. To shorten
notation we denote conditional expectations by
Et,x [·] = E [· |Xt = x, T > t]
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Ex[·] = E0,x[·] and conditional probabilities by Pt,x [·] = P [· |Xt = x, T > t] and
Px[·] = P0,x[·]. Moreover, we introduce V (τ, x) as the expected utility of the agent
when she uses the strategy τ and the initial value of the process is x





Let us denote by V ? : X → R the value of the agent when he uses the optimal
strategy
V ?(x) = sup
τ
V (τ, x) .
The following lemma proven in the Appendix establishes a probability theoretic
result that will be useful to derive the optimal strategy.
Lemma 1 (Probability to Stop before the Deadline). When using the cut-off
strategy τ(b) as a continuation strategy at a given level Xt = x, the probability of
stopping before the game ends, τ(b) < T , is given by





)α for all b ≥ x
1 else
,














As a consequence of Lemma 1 the expected utility from using the cut-off strategy
τ(b) as a continuation strategy from x ≤ b, equals










At any point x > b, the cut-off strategy τ(b) stops immediately and therefore






u(b−K) for x ≤ b
u(x−K) for x > b
. (1.3)
If the agent decides to stop at a point x his payoff equals u(x−K) if she decides
to continue until either the process reached xh or the game ended he gets an
expected payoff of
V (τ(xh), x) = h−αu(xh−K) .
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Definition 2. We denote by Γ : X → R the expected gain from waiting until the
process reached xh instead of stopping at x
Γ(x) = h−αu(xh−K)− u(x−K) .
Γ describes the expected gain from waiting until the process makes one uptick.
The following lemma shows that the gain from any other cut-off strategy can be
expressed in terms of Γ.
Lemma 2 (Expected Payoff of a Cut-off Strategy). The expected gain from using
the cut-off strategy τ(xhn) instead of stopping at x is given by




Proof. We show the result inductively using the fact that once the agent reaches
xhn−1 his continuation value is given by the expected value of waiting for one
uptick














Γ(xhn−1) + u(xhn−1 −K)
)]





= V (τ(xhn−1), x) + h−(n−1)αΓ(xhn−1) .
The result follows inductively in combination with the fact that V (τ(x), x) =
u(x−K).
Define the point bu ∈ X as the smallest point such that it is not profitable to
wait until the process reaches buh, i.e.
bu = min{x ∈ X : Γ(x) ≤ 0} .
By definition of bu it is never optimal to stop below bu. If Γ(bu) = 0 the agent is
indifferent between stopping at bu and waiting for one more uptick. Then, τ(bu)
can not be the unique optimal strategy. As this case is non-generic under random
small perturbations of u we assume through the paper that Γ(bu) 6= 0.
Definition 3 (Expected Change). For every function w : X → R, we denote by
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Lw : X → R the expected change in w from period t to period t + 1, conditional
on being at x
Lw(x) = Et,x
[




pw(xh−K) + (1− p)w(xh−1 −K)
)
− w(x−K) .
The following assumption ensures that the optimal strategy always stops above
bu.
Assumption 2 (Single Crossing). The expected change in utility Lu(x − K) is
negative for all x > bu.
Assumption 2 ensures that stopping immediately is better than continuing and
stopping in the next period for all x > bu. As the next Lemma shows Assumption
2 is a necessary condition for optimal strategies to be cut-off strategies
Lemma 3. If Assumption 2 is violated and u is concave no optimal strategy is a
cut-off strategy.
It can be shown that if u is not concave and Assumption 2 is violated at least
one optimal strategy is not a cut-off strategy. We say that an agent has constant
absolute risk-aversion if u(x) = −1
θ
exp(−θx) for some θ ≥ 0 and has constant
relative risk-aversion if u(x) = 1
θ
((x + K)θ − Kθ) for some θ ∈ (0, α).4 The
following Lemma is proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 4. Assumption 2 is satisfied if u has constant absolute or relative risk-
aversion.
As the next Proposition shows Assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure that stopping
is better than any continuation strategy for all x ≥ bu.
Proposition 1 (The Optimal Strategy). The unique subgame perfect optimal
strategy continues for all values x < bu and stops for all values x ≥ bu.
Proof. τ(bu) is an optimal strategy:
In the first step we prove that stopping above bu is an optimal strategy. To shorten
4To ensure the utility of negative outcomes is well defined we look at constant relative risk-
aversion relative to the wealth level (x+K).
10
notation let us denote byW : X → R the continuation value from using the cut-off
strategy τ(b) derived in (1.3)






u(bu −K) for x ≤ bu
u(x−K) for x > bu
.
By the dynamic programming principle (cf. Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, Theorem
1.11), τ(bu) is an optimal strategy if and only if the function W (x) satisfies the
dynamic programming equation for all x ∈ X
max{LW (x), u(x−K)−W (x)} = 0 . (1.4)
We have that W (x) = u(x −K) for all x ≥ bu. Hence, LW (x) = Lu(x) < 0 for
all x > bu and (1.4) is satisfied for all x > bu. Let n = log(b
u/x)
log(h)
, by Lemma 2 and
the definition of bu we have that for all x < bu
u(x−K)−W (x) = −
n∑
j=1
h−(j−1)αΓ(xhj) < 0 .
For all x < bu it holds that Et,x[1{t+1<T}W (Xt+1] = W (x), thus LW (x) = 0 for all
x < bu, and hence (1.4) is satisfied for all x < bu. It remains to verify that (1.4)
is satisfied for x = bu. By definition W (bu) = u(bu −K) and thus, it remains to
prove that LW (bu) ≤ 0






























By definition of bu and as Γ(bu) 6= 0 we have u(buh−K)/u(bu−K) < hα. As h is
the larger solution to the equation δ(phα + (1 − p)h−α) = 1 the expected change
of W at b? is negative










τ(bu) is the unique optimal strategy:
By Definition of bu it is never optimal to stop at x < bu. As we have shown that
V ? = W and LW (x) = Lu(x−K) < 0 for all x > bu and thus it is never optimal
to continue at x > bu. As shown above LW (bu) < 0 and hence it is not optimal
to continue at bu.
Proposition 1 did not require the utility function u to be differentiable or concave
as long as Assumption 2 is satisfied. It therefore covers cases where u has a kink
at a reference point r. Where this reference point lies is immaterial to our results,
as long as r is determined a priori and constant.
As no concavity of u is required Proposition 1 furthermore covers cases of S-
shaped utility as in Kahneman & Tversky (1979b), i.e. risk-seeking behavior below
and risk-averse behavior above the reference point.5
When the reference point r is the a priori expected utility from stopping the
process then this may be viewed as a model of disappointment à la Loomes &
Sugden (1986). It then follows from Proposition 1 that a model of elation or
disappointment does not predict path-dependent behavior in our setting. Inter-
estingly, experimental evidence seems to support this prediction. For example,
Summers & Duxbury (2007) find that in an experiment where subjects do not ac-
tively trade fictitious assets, the disposition effect does not appear, while it does
so when subjects had to actively choose their portfolio. They conclude that regret
and self-blame as opposed to disappointment, which lacks the self-blame compo-
nent, is a key building block in explaining the disposition effect. Our theoretical
model provides a rigorous argument for this finding.
1.4.2. Regret Preferences
In this section we examine the model predictions if the agent experiences regret.
For a regret agent, the utility associated with the consequence of his action, is
not solely a function of final wealth, but the difference between final wealth and
the ex post optimal outcome. If the action chosen by the agent is ex post subop-
timal, the agent feels regret. This makes choice context dependent, because the
expected utility associated with a given act, depends on what are the counterfac-
tual outcomes of the remaining acts available to the agent. In our setting, it is
5For a detailed discussion of the stopping behaviour of prospect theory agent with probability
distortion and naivite (Ebert & Strack, 2012), with probability distortion and commitment
(Xu & Zhou, 2013) or without probability distortion see Henderson (2012).
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always ex-post optimal for the agent to stop when the process was at its maxi-
mum. Therefore regret preferences are preferences where the historical peak of
the process is the reference point. The objective of the agent is then to minimize
the expected regret.
To model regret aversion in our setting, we assume that the intensity with which
the agent feels regret is linear in the utility difference between his strategy and the
strategy that turns out to be ex-post optimal. In our setting there are generally
two possibilities: regret relative to past and future decisions or regret relative only
to past decisions.
Regret over Past and Future Decisions
Several authors argue that the anticipation of future regret affects choices in the
present (see i.e. Loomes & Sugden, 1982). More precisely, because the agent does
observe the process even after she stopped, she might also anticipate to feel regret
relative to the maximum attained not only prior to stopping, but over the whole
time horizon until T .
Let us denote by St = maxr≤tXr the maximal value of the process prior to
time t. Clearly, the ex-post optimal decision for the agent is to stop when the
process reaches its maximal value ST , which would have given her a utility of
maxt u(Xt −K) = u(ST −K).6 The regret experienced by the agent is linear in
her loss of utility due to taking a suboptimal decision
u(Sτ −K)− 1{τ<T}u(Xτ −K) .
Note, that the agent enjoys the benefits of stopping u(Xτ −K) only if she stops
before the deadline τ < T , while she suffers the regret also if she does not stop
before T . Thus, after a history such that the value of the process equals x and its
past maximum equals s in period t the regret value associated with the stopping
strategy τ ≥ t equals












− κEt,x,s [u(ST −K)] , (1.5)
where κ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the intensity of regret. Regret preferences contain ex-
6Note, that we assumed that the process starts above K and thus stopping at the maximal
value ST ≥ K is always better than not stopping at all.
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pected utility preferences for κ = 0.
However, the case where the agent feels regret relative to past and future deci-
sions does not yield behaviorally different predictions from expected utility. To see
this, note that the expected regret E [u(ST −K)] is independent from the agent’s
stopping strategy τ and thus an agent who exhibits regret over past and future
decisions behaves exactly as the corresponding EU agent.
Proposition 2. The cut-off strategy τ(bu) is the unique optimal continuation
strategy for the agent experiencing regret over past and future decisions. That is,
τ(bu) maximizes the regret functional defined in Equation (1.5) after every history.
Thus, there is no way to distinguish regret over past and future decisions from
EU. We therefore consider only regret over past decisions below.
Regret Only over Past Decisions
If the agent feels regret only relative to past decisions, the ex-post optimal decision
for the agent is to stop at the time t before τ when the process reached its maximal
value. This strategy would have given her a utility of maxt≤τ u(Xt−K) = u(Sτ −
K). Thus, the regret functional equals




− κE [u(Sτ −K)] . (1.6)
As in the expected utility case we denote the value from using the continuation
strategy τ at the point Xt = x and the past maximum equals St = s by V r(τ, x, s).
An important feature of regret preferences over past decisions is their history-
dependence. At first glance such preferences seem to have the potential to ra-
tionalize behavior that under EU would have been classified as time-inconsistent.
In an asset-selling setting the incentive to sell the asset, is higher the lower the
historical peak relative to the current price. Given that the reference or aspiration
level of an agent changes with the history of the process, one might believe that,
because the agent is reluctant to realize a loss, she adopts a path-dependent strat-
egy. The results below, however, show that if the agent always behaves optimally
this is not the case.
We begin by establishing that the regret agent never stops after the agent max-
imizing expected utility.
Lemma 5. It is optimal for the regret agent to stop at all points x ≥ bu.
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Proof. We first show that the regret agent always stops above the expected utility
cut-off bu. Note, that by definition of bu any strategy that continues at a point








Furthermore, the maximum only increases over time and thus regret increases, i.e.
Et,x,s [u(Sτ −K)] > u(s−K) for all stopping times τ > t. Hence, it is optimal to





1{τ<T}u(Xτ −K)− κu(Sτ −K)
]
< u(x−K)− κu(s−K) .
Intuitively, regret can only make it less attractive to continue, as continuing
always entails the risk of increased regret. As continuing above bu is not optimal
without regret it can never be optimal with regret. In the next step we show that
below the expected utility cut-off is never optimal for the regret agent to stop
below the past maximum.
Lemma 6. It is never optimal for the regret agent to stop when Xt < St ≤ bu.
Proof. Let Xt = x < s = St ≤ bu. By Lemma 2 the expected change in utility







As the strategy τ(s) never stops above the past maximum s it follows that the
regret never increases u(Sτ(s) −K) = u(s−K). Thus, it is always better to wait
until the process is back at its past maximum s than stopping at a value x < s
Et,x,s
[
1{τ(s)<T}u(Xτ(s) −K)− κu(Sτ(s) −K)
]
> u(x−K)− κu(s−K) .
Intuitively as regret is sunk and does not change until the process reaches his
past maximum again it can never be optimal to stop the process below its past
maximum. Note, that as a consequence of Lemma 6 the agent never experiences
regret when stopping below bu.
We define Γr : X → R as the expected change in value from waiting until the
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process reaches xh instead of stopping at x = Xt = St:
Γr(x) =
(
Px [τ(xh) < T ] (1− κ)u(xh−K)− Px [τ(xh) ≥ T ] κu(x−K)
)
− (1− κ)u(x−K)
= h−α(1− κ)u(xh−K)− κ(1− h−α)u(x−K)− (1− κ)u(x−K)
= h−α(1− κ)u(xh−K)− (1− κh−α)u(x−K) .
Define the cut-off br by
br = min{x ∈ X : Γr(x) ≤ 0} . (1.7)
As in the expected utility case we assume that Γr(br) 6= 0. Furthermore, we
assume that the expected gain in payoff from waiting for an up-tick Γr changes
its sign once.
Assumption 3. We assume that Γr(x) < 0 for all x ≥ br.
This is a weak assumption and the next Lemma establishes that it is satisfied
for all risk-averse agents.
Lemma 7. If u is concave than Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Proof. First, we establish existence of br. For that we need to show that Γr crosses
zero at least once. The change of Γr in x equals
Γr(xh)− Γr(x) =
(




h−α(1− κ)u(xh−K)− (1− κh−α)u(x−K)
)




− (1− κh−α) (u(xh−K)− u(x−K)) (1.8)






Multiplying by both sides x(h− 1) and as α > 1 it follows










As 1 − κ < 1 − κh−α Equation (1.8) is negative. Consequently, Equation Γ is
strictly decreasing and changes sign at most once.
The next proposition shows that it is optimal to stop if and only if the past
maximum of the process St is at least br and the process is at its maximal value
Xt = St or the process xt is above the expected utility cut-off bu.
Proposition 3. The optimal strategy stops if and only if Xt ≥ br and Xt ≥
min{bu, St}.
Proof. We already establishes that is optimal to stop Xt ≥ bu and optimal to
continue for Xt < St ≤ bu. By definition of br it is optimal to wait for an up-tick
at Xt = St < br. It remains to show that it is optimal to stop for Xt = St ≥ br.
We prove this result by induction. As show it is strictly optimal to stop at
Xt = St = b
u. Let Xt ≥ br and suppose it is strictly optimal to stop once the
process reaches Xth. Than, the change in payoff from waiting for this uptick is
given by
V r(x)− (1− κ)u(x−K) = Γr(x) ,
which is negative by definition of br. Hence, it is strictly optimal to stop at Xt.
We have plotted the subgame perfect optimal stopping strategy of the regret
agent in Figure 1.1. For s < br, the agent’s optimal continuation strategy is the
cut-off strategy τ(br), especially it is independent of s. The optimal continuation
strategy changes if the agent misses to fulfill her initial plan, i.e. to stop at br
finds herself in a history where s exceeds br. The optimal continuation strategy
now prescribes the agent to wait for the process to return to s.
Consider a path where the process reaches br a second time, i.e. Xt = br and
s > br. Under EU, the situation has not changed relative to the first visit, because
the running maximum s is immaterial to the EU agent. For the regret agent, this
is different: Compared to the situation where s = x = br, the regret associated
increased. The higher regret also enters the continuation value, but to lesser
extent, because continuation includes the prospect of making up for the current
regret. The prospect of making up for the current regret motivates the agent to
continue until the process reach s again.7
7This behavior resembles the gambling for resurrection described in the finance literature.
While gambling for resurrection in this literature occurs, because the agent is insured against




are expected to use cut-off strategies. That is, they are predicted to (i) stop the
process at a unique reservation level that depends on their preferences and (ii) to
never stop at a point they chose to continue before. We show that is indeed a
very robust prediction about behavior which holds not only under EU, but also
for gain-loss preferences and also for an agent who experiences regret. While
this is by far not a new result under EU, we demonstrated that it holds under
more general circumstances than previously known. Hence, from a theoretical
perspective, we would expect subjects in a controlled environment to play roughly
the same reservation level across different repetitions of the same stopping task and
to behave time-consistently within rounds. We test this prediction in a companion
experiment in the next chapter.
2 Too proud to stop: Stopping behavior in the
laboratory
This chapter is based on joint work with Philipp Strack.
2.1. Introduction
Many important economic decisions are modeled as optimal stopping problems,
where an agent has to trade the immediate gains from stopping against the loss
of the option to act tomorrow. While stopping theory has been widely applied
throughout economics, there is little empirical, let alone experimental, evidence
on whether theoretical models of optimal stopping describe actual choices. Given
that stopping theory is widely applied, however, it appears important to test key
predictions of it and gauge in how far it is able to predict actual behavior. This
chapter puts forward a direct test in form of a controlled laboratory experiment
to shine more light on this issue.
In the given setting we have shown earlier that the optimal stopping rule is
simple: The optimal strategy is to stop the first time the payoff process crosses a
certain threshold level. Hence, the optimal strategy has two important properties:
(i) it is a reservation-level strategy, i.e. the agent has a unique payoff reservation
level that makes it optimal for her to seize the option, and (ii) the agent behaves
time-consistent, i.e. the process is stopped the first time it reaches this reservation
level.
While the theoretical literature on optimal stopping theory is vast (see e.g.
Peskir & Shiryaev, 2006, for an overview) few experimental studies on choice
behavior in optimal stopping problems exist. Most of these studies solely con-
sider the expected utility benchmark for behavior and are solely concerned with
inspecting whether subjects’ reservation levels fall short of or exceed the risk-
neutral level. For example, it is inspected ín a stylized job-search setting whether
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subjects search too much or too little before taking an offer, or whether they take
an offer at a value xi that is above or below the risk-neutral optimal cut-off. A
common conclusion of nearly all of these studies is that expected utility describes
behavior well. For example, Rapoport & Tversky (1970) write: "The results of the
present study suggest that the optimal model provides a reasonably good account
of the behavior of the subjects." (p.112) and more recently Oprea, Friedman &
Anderson (2009) for example conclude that: "(...) behavior approaches optimality
in all treatments." (p. 1104).
However, if optimal stopping theory is to describe actual behavior it is arguably
even more important that choices strictly adhere to the second property of the
optimal strategy than to the first. Stopping a process at a value that has previ-
ously been reached cannot be reconciled with any time-consistent preference of
the expected-utility type and even time-inconsistent preferences such as minimax
regret. Finding that such behavior is abundant would therefore cast doubt on the
claim that expected utility can provide an adequate description of actual behav-
ior. To the authors’ best knowledge, there is no paper that systematically inspects
deviations along this dimension.1 Hence, a crucial deviation from the prediction
of expected utility may have gone undetected in earlier papers.
And indeed, the data we obtained from a choice experiment in the laboratory
confirms that time-inconsistent behavior is abundant. In our sample (i) subjects
generally show no tendency to have a unique reservation level across rounds and
show little to no convergence towards such a constant level, and (ii) subjects in
the laboratory make time-inconsistent choices in 75% of all cases. This, on the
one hand, is a strong albeit discouraging result in the given setting, because it
means that 75% of the observed stopping choices cannot be reconciled with any
of the deterministic models we have analyzed before.
On the other hand, visual inspection of our data already suggests that determin-
istic models of choice are likely to be descriptively deficient. In order to account
for the possibility that large part of the variation and time-inconsistency could
be due to random choice errors, we then use our closed-form expressions for the
continuation and stopping value of an agent to fit a dynamic binary choice model
to the data. Such an empirical model is not only interesting because it is able
to capture noise in the data, but also because in a model with random choice
errors, the regret model becomes testable. Hence, given the stopping decisions of
1A notable exception is Gneezy (2005), who makes a first step in this direction.
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subjects, we are able to use the likelihood principle to assess whether observed
decisions lend more support to a model of random expected utility or a model of
random regret. Recall that the behavioral difference between regret and expected
utility arises in a model where agent may unexpectedly fail to implement their ex
ante plan. That is, when a regret agent reaches a point above her ex ante optimal
cut-off, but below the running maximum of the process, she will not want to stop,
but wait for the process to return to its previous maximum and stop then. In fact,
this is a choice pattern we observe to be abundant in our data. Fitting a struc-
tural econometric model to the tick-level data on stopping decisions, we find that
a model with regret aversion explains the data significantly better than a model
without regret. This result also relates to the finding by Oprea et al. (2009), that
subjects seem adjust their reservation levels in a given round in response to forgone
earnings in previous rounds. While Oprea et al. document a form of inter-round
regret, we find that also intra-round regret affects the reservation level of subjects.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 1.2 we briefly review the exist-
ing literature. In section 1.3 we introduce the general setting and our notation.
Section 1.4 provides the main theoretical results. It only provides a few proofs
that we feel to be crucial for reading. All other technical details can be found in
the appendix. In section 2.4 we present the experimental results and an empirical
analysis with respect to the model predictions.
2.2. Related Literature
Compared to the theoretical literature, the experimental literature on optimal
stopping is relatively small. The first experimental papers due to Amnon Rapoport
and co-authors, contrast the theoretical predictions from sequential search mod-
els with individual behavior in the laboratory (see inter alia Rapoport & Tver-
sky, 1966; Kahan, Rapoport & Jones, 1967; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970; Seale
& Rapoport, 1997, and references therein). These experiments test theoretical
predictions made by models of sequential search. Caplin, Dean & Daniel (2011)
inspect a static search model with recall, where subjects had unlimited time to
search among a set of alternatives displayed on a screen. In a similar vein, there is
a strand of experimental literature putting a focus on testing implication for the
particular class of job search models in the laboratory along various dimensions,
e.g. Schotter & Braunstein (1981); Cox & Oaxaca (1989, 1992, 2000) and Brown,
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Table 2.1.: Parameters for the binomial random walk in the experiment.
Cost K Stepsize h Uptick prob. p Exp. prob. 1− δ
40 1.06 52 % 0.7 %
Flinn & Schotter (2011).
Oprea et al. (2009) choose an experimental design, aimed at replicating the in-
vestment setting motivated in Dixit & Pindyck (1994b). In their paper, subjects
observe a geometric binomial random walk and have the option to earn the current
value of the random walk less some fixed cost, or forgo it in favor of future values.
We replicate their setup in this paper. They find that subjects approximate the
risk-neutral optimal strategy surprisingly well. While in three out of four treat-
ments with different parameters for the evolution of the random walk, subjects
stop too early, stopping decisions are nearly optimal in one treatment. Moreover,
Oprea et al. show that subjects adjust their reservation levels in response to for-
gone earnings, i.e. regret associated with their stopping decision in the current
round, leads them to reconsider their strategy in the coming rounds.
2.3. A laboratory experiment
In order to investigate individuals’ behavior and to test our predictions about
behavior, we implemented exactly the theoretical setting described in the previous
section in the laboratory. Testing individual behavior in a controlled laboratory
setting has several advantages over using field data. First, we can ensure that the
environment in which subjects make their decisions is truly stationary, i.e. the
probability law driving the process is known and time-homogeneous. Second, we
also have full discretion over the payoff-relevant state variables of a subject. With
field data, we can never be entirely sure to observe all relevant state variables
an individual integrates into her decision-making process. In the laboratory, we
have full discretion over all payoff-relevant state variables. Especially for testing
the time-consistency property, both points are crucial. The experiment was
conducted as a computer-based experiment at the laboratory of the Technical
University Berlin (TU) and the WZB Berlin. The experimental software was
programmed using Java and Python and ran in a browser. We ran two sessions,
each session with 22 students that were randomly recruited from the ORSEE pool
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Figure 2.1.: The main experimental screen (in German).
of the TU and WZB.2 Each of the 44 subjects in our sample, played 65 rounds for
pay. For each round played by subjects, we either observe a stopping decision or
that the process jumped to zero before a subjects decided to stop. The latter is
true for about 56%, i.e. 1581 out of the total 2860, in our sample.
Before the actual experiment, subjects received a four-page instruction explain-
ing the upcoming experiment. In the instructions, we framed the optimal stopping
task as an asset-selling problem. Subjects were explained that they own a ficti-
tious stock and that they have the opportunity, but not the obligation, to sell
it. The instructions then explained in detail the setting discussed in section 1.3
and the meaning of the relevant parameters, e.g. the uptick probability p and the
step size h. The actual values for the parameters were given to subjects and are
listed in Table 2.1. Subjects were hence fully informed about how processes were
generated.3
After subjects finished reading the instructions, they were prompted to login
and begin the actual experiment. The experiment consisted of 65 rounds in which
subjects had the option to sell their stock. In each round, subjects observed the
path of the market price in a diagram (see Figure 2.1). At the beginning of each
2See: https://experimente.wzb.eu/
3We convinced ourselves that subjects had indeed understood (i) how payoffs are computed,
(ii) that the increments of the process are iid and (iii) what is the risk that a round ends
before the next period, through a questionnaire with control questions that subjects had
to answer prior to the experiment (see appendix). 95% of the time subjects answered our
control questions correctly.
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round, the computer loaded the screen with an empty diagram. At the bottom
of the screen there were three buttons available. Upon pressing the left-hand
button, labeled ’Start round’, subjects started a given round.4 That triggered
the market price to be displayed as a jagged blue line until the jump to zero in
period T . Each second there were two ticks of the price process. Additionally,
subjects were displayed several other details about a round in a panel to the right
of the diagram. As soon as a round was started, the middle button, labeled ’Sell’,
became active. Pressing this button, a subject sold the stock at the current value
of the price process. Future values of the process were then displayed in green as
to visualize that selling had occurred. The right-hand button, which was inactive
until the jump to zero, gave subjects the opportunity to move to the next round.5
The paths of the 65 random walks were generated prior to the experiment and
were the same for all subjects. However, based on an individual login printed on
the instructions, the order in which the set of 65 paths was shown to subjects was
shuffled randomly.
At the end of the experiment one round was randomly selected with equal
probability to determine a subject’s payoff. Subjects were informed about which
round was drawn on a final screen that listed their performance in each round
played together with their final payoff. Subjects earned 0.15 times the number
of points they had obtained in the round that was drawn by the computer plus
10 Euros show-up fee.6 The average duration of the overall experiment was 80
minutes, and the mean earnings for subjects was 12.30 Euros (median=10 Euros),
where the minimum and the maximum payment were 10.00 Euros and 19.00 Euros
respectively.
2.4. Experimental results
Following the literature, we call the valueXτ at which the agent decided to stop her
reservation level. As shown in Proposition 1 and 3 an agent maximizing expected
utility or minimizing regret should not vary her reservation level between rounds.
We thus first inspect to which extent subjects do have a constant reservation
4The remaining two buttons were disabled before the round was started.
5We could have given subjects the option to skip to the next round immediately after the
stopping decision. This, however, may provide incentives to impatient subjects to stop early
and reduce lab time.
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Figure 2.2.: Line in the upper chart shows how the expected payoff from using
different cut-offs changes as a percentage of the payoff under the optimal strat-
egy (left scale), grey bars show a histogram of actual reservation levels (right
scale). Boxplots in bottom chart illustrate the variation in reservation levels
at the subject level. The vertical line indicates the optimal cut-off for a risk
neutral agent.
level across different rounds. We then inspect in how far their reservation level is
constant or time-consistent within rounds.
2.4.1. Do People have a constant reservation level?
The histogram of reservation levels in the top chart in Figure 2.2 shows that there
is a large variation in reservation levels across rounds, ranging from slightly above
the starting value of X0 = 40 to the optimal risk-neutral level 128.3. The boxplots
in the bottom chart of Figure 2.2 decompose this further into between- and within-
subject variation of reservation levels. The within-subject variation accounts for
33.2% of the total variation and there is no subject for which the distance between
the minimal and maximal reservation level is less than 50.41. Thus, dispersion of
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Table 2.2.: Average variance of reservation levels across subjects over blocks
of 10 rounds.
Rounds 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 60-65
Variance 366.94 503.81 232.03 311.84 481.02 335.05 123.78
reservation levels is not solely due to individual differences between subjects and
quite substantial in absolute terms. This shows that subjects do not play unique
reservation level strategies.
It is still possible, however, that within-subject variation is due to the gradual
convergence of reservation levels: subjects could successively adapt their reserva-
tion level towards a unique level after several rounds of experimentation. If that
were the case, we would expect the variation in reservation levels to decrease in the
number of rounds played and to settle at some constant level. Figure B.1 in the
appendix shows the observed reservation levels for each subjects over all rounds
played in our experiment and from Oprea et al. (2009). In both experiments, the
observed variation does not decrease in the number of rounds for the vast majority
of subjects. In Table 2.2 we report the average variance of reservation levels across
subjects for different blocks or rounds. Variances do not decrease on average over
the course of the experiment, but fluctuate unsystematically.
Finding 1. Subjects vary their reservation levels substantially over different rounds
of the same stopping task and do not appear to converge to a unique level.
Finding that subjects’ reservation levels do not settle to a constant level does not
necessarily mean that their variation is entirely unsystematic. Following Oprea
et al. (2009), we therefore estimated a model on the pooled data, where subjects
use a cut-off strategy τ(bj) in every round j and adapt their reservation level bj
in response to forgone earnings in the previous round. More specifically, Oprea
et al. assume that the reservation level bj in round j follows a simple linear model,
which makes the difference in reservation levels between round j and j−1 a linear
function of previous losses
bj = bj−1 +K
[
δE1{τ j−1<T} + δL1{τ j−1≥T}
] (
Sj−1
τ j−1 − b
j−1) . (2.1)
The parameters δE and δL measure an individual’s sensitivity to a loss that stems
from stopping below Sj and from not having stopped before the deadline, re-
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Table 2.3.: Estimated effects of losses on subsequent stopping choices.
Parameter Oprea et al. This study
δE × 1, 000 0.5486*** 1.3873**
δL × 1, 000 -0.9185*** -1.1227
Notes: Median estimates and p-value for the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test that the distribution is
centered around zero: *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05
and * p ≤ 0.1.
spectively.7 In Table 2.3 we follow Oprea et al. and report the median of the
by-subject median of δE and δL. Our estimates are qualitatively similar to that of
Oprea et al.. The estimate for δE implies that subjects increase their reservation
level, if in the previous round they observed that after stopping they could have
stopped at higher values. The estimate for δL implies that subjects reduce their
reservation level, if in the previous round the process jumped to zero before they
stopped and they missed the opportunity to get a positive payoff. In our sample
the adjustment to the latter is not statistically significant.8
To inspect how much variation between rounds can be explained by this model,
we took the first observed reservation level for each subject and forecasted their
reservation levels for all remaining rounds. We have plotted the results in Figure
B.2 in the appendix. The plot shows that the model has limited explanatory power
in our sample. In the first 20 rounds, the adaption model tracks the development
of reservation levels reasonably well, but it clearly overshoots thereafter. This
shows that the entire variation captured in the estimated adjustment coefficients
stems from behavior in the first 20 rounds.
Finding 2. Subjects calibrate their reservation levels during the first 20 rounds in
response to forgone earnings and then stop to systematically adjust and stick with
this level for all later rounds.
7 We use the same estimation method as Oprea et al. (2009). That is, we obtain an estimate of
δE for each two consecutive rounds a subject stopped by setting bj = X
j
τj and solving for δE
in (2.1). For each block of consecutive rounds without observing a subjects stopping decision,
we may use the two adjacent reservation levels to estimate δL from the losses suffered due
to not stopping.
8This is actually a common finding of most of the literature on regret and counterfactual
thinking, i.e. that people experience more regret over outcomes that stem from action than
from equally miserable outcomes that stem from inaction (see e.g. Kahneman & Tversky,
1982; Gilovich et al., 1998; Coricelli et al., 2005; Summers & Duxbury, 2007).
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Table 2.4.: Contingency table for observed decisions.
Xτ = Sτ Xτ < Sτ No. of obs.
stopped first time 326 (25%) 0 (0%) 326 (25%)
not stopped first time 205 (16%) 748 (58%) 953 (75%)
No. of obs. 531 (42%) 748 (58%) 1279 (100%)
Notes: Decisions in the upper left cell are time-consistent. Other cells
represent number of deviations from the time-consistency property in terms
of the maximum of the process and the multiplicity of the stopping value
in the history of the process. Xt denotes the value of the process and
St = maxs≤tXs. Percentage of total observations in parentheses.
2.4.2. Do People use Time-Consistent Strategies?
In the previous section we found that subjects’ behavior is not constant across
different rounds. But do subjects play constant reservation levels within rounds?
We first measure deviations from this time-consistency property along two dimen-
sions: (i) we count the number of ticks the stopping value is below the current
running maximum and (ii) we count the deviation in terms of multiplicity, i.e. we
count the number of times a subject had seen her stopping value before stopping
eventually.
Table 2.4 shows the results in a simple contingency table. The columns of table
2.4 contain observations that correspond to stopping at the running maximum
(left column) and below the running maximum (right column). Hence, 42% of
observations stop at the maximum of the process. The remaining 58% do not.
The rows of tab. 2.4 contain observations that correspond to stopping decisions
that stopped the first time the process reached this value (top row) and decisions
that stopped afterwards (bottom row). We observe only 326 out of 1279, i.e.
roughly 25%, decisions that are perfect cut-off decisions. The remaining 75% are
not.
Finding 3. Subjects stopping decisions are not time-consistent 75% of the time.
It is worth to stress that the above finding is a strong result in our setting. In
fact, this renders 75% of all observed stopping decisions are irreconcilable with
any of the choice models we presented earlier.
To shed more light on the magnitude of time-inconsistency, we have plotted a
histogram of the multiplicity of subjects’ stopping decisions in Figure 2.3. The
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Figure 2.3.: The empirical distribution of the multiplicity of stopped values for
all subjects (left) and the number of ticks subjects stopped below the previous
maximum (right).
on average stop at a point they have seen three times before. The maximum
multiplicity is equal to 29. About 35% of the observed stopping decisions have a
multiplicity greater two.
In light of these findings, subjects clearly do not play cut-off strategies. Instead
they vary their reservation levels over different rounds of the same stopping task,
do not behave time-consistently 75% of the time and visit the same level of the
process on average three times before they eventually stop at it.
An interesting feature of the observed behavior is that stopping seldom occurs
appreciably below the past maximum. That is, while 59% of the observed stopping
decisions are such that stopping occurs below the past maximum. The histogram
on the right of figure 2.3 shows that the difference between the stopped value and
the past maximum is seldom more than two or three ticks.
Finding 4. Subjects show a disposition to stop near the past maximum of the
process and not to stop appreciably below.
Given that in the experiment there are two ticks every second, it seems possible
on the one hand that subjects attempt to stop at the maximum the first time, but
their limited reaction time often leads to miss the exact maximum and fall slightly
below. On the other hand, more systematic forces such as an aversion to realize
a loss relative to the past maximum could lead subjects to deliberately waive any
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smaller values. In the next section, we put forward a structural econometric model
that is capable of disentangling the two possible explanations in a likelihood sense.
2.4.3. Dynamic stochastic choice
The observed deviations from cut-off behavior can be explained by introducing a
stochastic component alongside our structural or deterministic models of choice.
Not only does such a model open up a way to accommodate salient features of
our data, it also provides a way to test an expected utility model against a model
with regret.
In our model the process that leads the agent to stop or continue in period t
is influenced by the level of the process Xt and – in the case of regret – by the
running maximum St. As in the deterministic case, the choice between stopping
and continuation at a point (x, s) is determined by the difference between the
stopping value, we denote by sv(x, s), and the continuation value, we denote by
cv(x, s). The stopping value sv(x, s) is the utility from stopping at a given point
(Xt, St), i.e.
sv(x, s) = u(x−K)− κu(s−K) , (2.2)
and cv(x, s) is the expected utility from rejecting the current offer in favor of future
offers. With probability 1− δ the process jumps to zero in the coming period and
continuation yields a payoff of u(0)− κu(s−K). With probability δ the process
does not jump to zero, but increases or decreases by one tick. Hence, the agent
will continue from hx with probability p, and from h−1 x with probability (1− p).
Thus, using Equation (1.3)
cv(x, s) =
δ [pV ?(xh, s) + (1− p)V ?(xh−1, s)]− (1− δ)κu(s−K) if x < s ,δ [pV ?(xh, sh) + (1− p)V ?(xh−1, s)]− (1− δ)κu(s−K) if x = s .
In contrast to the deterministic case, there are now two additional factors that
affect choice. First, there is an unobserved factor εt. We assume that εt is a
random shock to the current utility difference between stopping and continuation.
One may view εt as a literal error term or some outside unobservable force, e.g. a
random taste shock, that hits the agent. We assume that εt is i.i.d. N (0, σ2). An
agent’s choice in period t is then viewed conditional on the realization of εt and is
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given by the choice function
ψ(x, s, ε) =
stop if sv(x, s)− cv(x, s) + ε ≥ 0continue if sv(x, s)− cv(x, s) + ε < 0 ,
Note that in order to calculate the expected utility from continuation with the
optimal strategy V ?, we need to evaluate the expected utility from continuation









ticular, this requires an expression for the anticipated regret, which is given in the
following lemma proven in the appendix
Lemma 8 (Anticipated Regret). The anticipated regret ρ(x, s, b) associated with
the cut-off strategy τ(b) when being at point (x, s) equals


















where m = log(b/x)
log(h)
.














for θ = 0 .
(2.3)
However, simultaneous estimation of the error variance σ2 and the curvature
of the utility θ generally is a delicate issue in models of stochastic discrete choice
(see e.g. Wilcox, 2011, for a discussion of such issues in static models). The reason
in our case is that a large variation in reservation levels across rounds leads to a
relatively large error variance. A high error variance, however, translates into a
low probability to reach higher levels of Xt a posteriori. In order to reconcile that
we do observe subjects stopping at high and low values of Xt, the model needs
to make subjects less risk averse because that increases their likelihood to reach
them. Hence, there is a purely mechanical relationship between σ and θ which
somewhat blurs the interpretation of θ as a measure of risk aversion in the sense
of Pratt (1964).
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We therefore incorporate a second terms that affects choice: inattention or
attentional lapse. This comes in the form of a constant probability w. In every
period t the agent does not pay attention with probability w, and continues with
probability one. We assume that w is constant across all rounds. Since we do not
observe w, we have to estimate it from the data. Note that under this assumption
the time between two periods that the agent does pay attention is exponentially
distributed and (1−w) is the rate of the distribution. Then we may interpret (1−
w)−1 as the average time between to periods the agent pays attention. Given that
in our experiment there are two ticks per second, it does not seem too far fetched
to assume that most subjects will not pay close enough attention to warrant the
assumption that they deliberate twice per second whether to stop or not. From a
purely mechanical point of view, the probability w provides a way to incorporate
variation into reservation levels without an unduly upsurge in variance and risk
tolerance of an agent.9
For estimation, denote by ψ̂t = 1 and ψ̂t = 0 the observation that the agent
decided to stop or continue in period t respectively and let γ = [θ, κ, σ, w] be
the vector of parameters to estimate. The probability that an agent chooses to
continue at a given point (x, s) then equals
P [continue at (x, s) | γ] = (1− w)Φσ (cv(x, s | θ, κ)− sv(x, s | θ, κ)) + w
where Φσ denotes the normal cdf with mean zero and variance σ2. To shorten
notation we will henceforth denote the conditioning on the parameters by Pγ.
Note that our model entails that mistakes are more likely to occur, if it is less
costly for the agent, i.e. when the difference between stopping and continuation
value is small.




t = x, S
(i,j)





denote the available data for
agent i in round j, the likelihood to observe that the agent stops in period τ
9We have fitted a model without an inattention parameter w and our results confirm that θ
and σ both inflate drastically. The implied reservation levels lie above 99% of the observed














Figure 2.4.: Illustrates how a regret model can be distinguished from an EU
model over rounds of the experiment.
equals10
p(Y (i,j) | γ) = 1{τ<T}(1− Pγ
[













As we mentioned before, the model provides us a way to judge whether the
fact that subjects tend stop near the past maximum of the process is significantly
related to regret or not. To see how this works, consider behavior over two consec-
utive rounds. Suppose the agent observes the two processes depicted in Figure 2.4
and stops at B in the first round. The agent thus missed to stop at point A, i.e.
the first time the level b(1) was reached. Under EU, the most likely explanation for
this decision in isolation is that the agent committed just a single error at point
A. Hence, fix θ such that b(1) is the ex ante optimal cut-off bu = b(1). Similarly,
fix the parameters (θ, κ) for a corresponding regret agent such that br = b(1).11 In
the next round, suppose that the agent stopped at point E, i.e. at a higher value
than in the previous round b(2) > b(1). For given parameters, the EU model can
10We are free to assume any value for ψ̂t after stopping occurred, because these periods do not
enter the likelihood function and are payoff-irrelevant. Note that the way we specify the
likelihood already takes into any effects of censoring and thus already corrects for any bias
that stems from rounds that subjects did not stop before T .
11According to Proposition 4, there always exists such a tuple.
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only reconcile this with the decision in the previous round by assuming that for all
points on the segment between C and E the subject erroneously continued to play.
As long as b(2) ≤ br, the regret agent only errs at the points on the segment from
C to D. For all points on the line segment from D to E, the agent does not want
to stop by Lemma 6. The regret agent’s continuation value is thus larger than
the stopping value. In terms of the likelihood given in equation (2.4), the latter
fact implies a higher second-round likelihood for the regret model. Intuitively, the
regret model is able to attribute more variation in behavior to the structural part
of the model and less to noise. Thus, if the described pattern is abundant in the
data, the regret model finds more support in terms of any likelihood criterion. If
the fact that subjects stop close to the past peak is merely because they missed to
stop at exactly the maximum due to some attentional lapse, the likelihood of the
regret model will only be marginally higher. Then any criterion that sufficiently
penalizes the regret model for its additional degree of freedom would prefer the
more parsimonious EU model. Additionally, the parameter w provides a way for
the model to attribute any such unsystematic variation to inattention. Hence,
any regret aversion that we find in our model, may be regarded as being net of
inattention or reaction time.
We use Bayesian inference to estimate the model. Given a prior distribution
p(γ) and the joint posterior density is proportional to prior times likelihood
p(γ | Y ) ∝ p(Y | γ)p(γ) . (2.5)
In the prior distribution we assume that θ, κ, w and σ are a priori independent
p(γ) = p(θ)p(κ)p(w)p(σ) . (2.6)
For κ and w we set the prior equal to the uniform distribution over the interval
[0, 1], for θ and σ we set an uninformative (Jeffreys) prior (Jeffreys, 1946)
p(γ) = Uniform(0, 1)× Uniform(0, 1)× 1
σ
. (2.7)
The joint posterior density is not of any known form and thus there is no di-
rect way to sample from it. We therefore first find the posterior modes of (2.5)
with a standard hill-climbing algorithm (BFGS) and take these as starting values
for a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (Metropolis-Hastings) that simulates
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the joint posterior of all unknowns (Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller
& Teller, 1953). The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm iterates over the followings
steps:
1. Step 0 (Initialization): Choose a starting values γ(0) and a candidate-
generating or proposal density Q(θ(s+1) | γ(s)).
2. Step 1 (Proposal): For iteration s generate a proposal γ̂ from Q based on
γ(s−1).









or reject the candidate with probability 1− α, i.e. set γ(s) = γ(s−1).
4. Step 3 (Iterate): Go back to Step 1.
This algorithm (i) accepts draws that are a posteriori more likely than the previous
draw with probability α = 1 and (ii) does not require expensive computation of
the normalizing constant of the posterior density p(γ | X) to evaluate α for each
sweep of the sampler. As starting values for γ we take the posterior modes, which
we determine using a standard gradient methods.12























 ∼ N (0,Σ) , (2.9)
hence the name random walk Metropolis-Hastings. The proposal density Q is
adapted while the sampler is iterating. We start the sampler by setting Σ equal to
the diagonal inverse Hessian or Fisher information matrix at the posterior mode.
After the first 100 iterations, the matrix Σ is adapted every 100 iterations and its
12We use the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm.
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Table 2.5.: Summary statistics for the posterior modes.
Exp. utility Regret
θ σ w θ κ σ w
Min. 0.18 1.96 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.16 0.00
1st Qu. 0.70 3.90 0.75 0.78 0.00 3.33 0.76
Mean 0.85 4.91 0.74 0.94 0.10 4.32 0.75
3rd Qu. 1.03 5.70 0.92 1.11 0.18 5.35 0.94
Max. 1.29 8.63 0.97 1.46 0.36 7.40 0.99




diag(V̂ar(θ(0.5s : s)), V̂ar(κ(0.5s : s)), V̂ar(σ(0.5s : s)), V̂ar(w(0.5s : s)))
where





(θ(i) − θ̄)2 (2.10)
and θ̄ denotes the sample mean of θ(i) for i = 0.5s, . . . , s.13 Note that adaption
helps tuning the algorithm. If Σ is such that proposed jumps through the pa-
rameter space are excessively large, this will result in a high rejection rate and
thus inefficient sampling. On the other hand, if Σ is such that Q only produces
small jumps through the parameter space, the sampler will be slow mixing and
not explore the parameters space sufficiently.
Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5 show summary statistics and histograms of the pos-
terior modes. We find that the average subject is mildly risk-averse under the
EU model and virtually risk-neutral under the regret model. This implies that
with regret the observed behavior is characterized by regret aversion, whereas
risk-aversion seems to play a negligible role. The probability w is found to be
relatively high in our sample. In terms of attentional lapse, the numbers imply
that the average subject in our sample makes decisions every 1.92 seconds in the
EU model and every 2 in the regret model. This seems to be a plausible amount
of inattention in our experiment, where the process evolves relatively fast.
We have plotted the simulated marginal posterior for κ per subject in Figure B.3
in the appendix. We find that for the majority of subjects, the bulk of posterior
13Haario, Saksman & Tamminen (2001) for details. Their algorithm is implemented in the R




Figure 2.5.: Histogram of posterior modes of θ and κ.
mass for κ is not at or close to zero, but that there is much posterior evidence that κ
is greater zero. The width of some of the posterior distributions also indicates that
κ is not easily identified from the data. Does the regret model therefore fit the data
better than the EU model? To have a fair comparison between the two models,
we have to take into account that the regret model has one additional degree of
freedom. We have therefore computed Akaike’s information at the posterior mode
AIC = −2LLF + 2 ∗ k ,
where LLF denotes the log-likelihood of the model and k stands for the number
of parameters in the model. The smaller the AIC, the better the fit of a model.
Because the AIC rises in the complexity of the model, i.e. in the number of pa-
rameters, more parsimonious models are preferred. In Figure 2.6 we have plotted
the differences between AIC of the EU and the regret models of all subjects. The
size of the points in the figure increases with the value of the posterior mode of
κ. According to the AIC, the regret model is preferred for 14 of our subjects, i.e.
32%.
Finding 5. There is significant evidence for regret aversion in our sample. One
third of our subjects systematically avoid to take a loss relative to the past maxi-
mum of the process, because they are regret-averse.
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Figure 2.6.: Shows the difference between the AIC of the EU and the regret
model.
2.5. Conclusion
A classical theoretical result from the optimal stopping literature is that the op-
timal strategy of an agent maximizing expected utility is to wait for the payoff
process to reach a given reservation level and then stop immediately. In the
first chapter of this dissertation, we have demonstrated that this is a very ro-
bust prediction about behavior. Moreover, our results made it very explicit that
time-consistency is a primitive feature of this prediction across different theories.
The existing experimental literature on stopping behavior mostly concludes that
subjects in the laboratory are able to closely approximate the risk-neutral optimal
reservation level (Rapoport & Tversky, 1970, 1966; Oprea et al., 2009). They are
mostly silent, however, with respect to time-consistency of the observed decisions.
In this paper we sought to answer to jointly analyze the extent to which subjects
in a controlled laboratory stopping task have (i) a unique reservation at which they
stop and (ii) what proportion of choices is truly time-consistent. If and to which
extent the time-consistency property is satisfied by subjects in the laboratory
has been largely unexplored in the extant literature. Actual behavior is found
to violate this property in roughly 75% of all cases, which casts doubt on the
hypothesis that EU describes actual behavior well.
Since our data shows a very strong stochastic component, we further analyze
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behavior under a notion of stochastic choice. That is, a we consider the possibility
that agents do not implement their ex-ante plan, but deviate unexpectedly from it.
We have shown in the first chapter that in this case, only a regret agent will behave
differently to an EU agent. The regret agent is predicted to be reluctant to stop
below the past maximum. It turns out this is a choice pattern that is prevalent in
our data: Subject seldom stop below the past peak, even though they do not stop
there the first time it is reached. We estimated therefore an econometric model of
random regret utility to test whether it helps to explain the variation in behavior
better than EU. Our results confirm that a regret model produces a better fit
than a corresponding stochastic expected utility model even after penalizing for
additional degrees of freedom for around one third of our subjects. This finding is
interesting in view of previous evidence due to Oprea et al. (2009) on the impact
of foregone earnings on reservation levels. Oprea et al. document that forgone
earnings from previous rounds affect choices in later rounds, while we provide
evidence that foregone earnings and the associated regret also play a role within
rounds.

3 Stopping with Ambiguous Payoffs
3.1. Introduction
Timing matters. Many decisions in economics are sequential timing decisions.
For example, you might have to decide whether to take a job offer or decline it
in favor of future offers, whether to invest your savings in the financial markets
now or later or whether to have a child at the current point in your career or
later. Similarly, firms may want to engage in R&D of a new technology not before
market situations are ’ripe’, or consider the benefits from hiring an employee given
that there is some sort of dismissal protection.
In general, in an optimal stopping problem, a decision maker faces a sequence
of payoffs (x1, x2, . . .), drawn from some distribution. After each realization of the
payoff process, the decision maker has to decide whether to continue sampling or
to stop sampling and exercise her option. The payoff from stopping may either be
a function of past realizations or future realizations. Both such timing problems
are optimal stopping problems, in the latter case one often speaks of an irreversible
investment problem.
What is common to all classical approaches to optimal stopping, is the as-
sumption that there is only one distribution driving the payoff process and this
distribution is perfectly known to the decision maker. Going from the level of
a stock-listed multinational corporation to the level of the individual, the latter
part of this assumption seems more and more problematic. Arguably, most deci-
sions taken by decision makers in the real world are such that they find it hard to
assign unique probabilities to future events, i.e. they are subject to ambiguity or
Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921).
Ambiguity in individual decision making, as introduced by Ellsberg (1961), has
been shown to matter in static one-shot choices in many experimental studies, the
earliest one being Becker & Brownson (1964). There is less evidence on whether
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and how ambiguity effects carry over to a dynamic setting. One reason might be
that every empirical analysis with field data will be inevitably marred by many
potential confounds. Experiments provide a way to safely control for such. Indeed,
the results obtained in this paper indicate that there exists a similar effect of
uncertainty in a dynamic or sequential setting and that this effect persists over a
large number of repetitions of the same stopping task. Subjects in a treatment
group, facing an ambiguous payoff process, invest, on average, later than subjects
facing a risky payoff process. The experiment is designed in a way, that (i) the
EU model predicts exactly the opposite and (ii) to control for the possibility that
subjects when facing ambiguity still hold a unique, but more pessimistic prior
belief. That is, under EU, those subjects facing an ambiguous payoff process
should in principle stop no later than subjects facing a risky payoff process. To
control for the potential confound of more pessimistic beliefs, the design exploits
the observation that ambiguity averse agents in the sense of Gilboa & Schmeidler
(1989) are predicted to be schizophrenic: irrespective of the possibility to take
either side of a bet, the agent will always be pessimistic.
The empirical results can also be viewed as reassuring for theorists working
with models of ambiguity aversion in dynamic settings. E.g. it provides an empir-
ical foundation for theoretical models of investment behavior and portfolio choice
where investors are ambiguity averse (see Epstein & Schneider, 2010, for a survey),
but may also serve as microfoundation for macroeconomic models which model
representative household or firm behavior with recursive multiple-prior preferences
(Ilut & Schneider, 2010). More generally, the present results also provide exper-
imental evidence for real options or Hartmann-Abel effects of higher uncertainty
on irreversible investments as in Abel & Eberly (1996); Bloom (2009). In the
present setting, however, the source of heightened uncertainty is not volatility (as
in Abel & Eberly, 1996; Bloom, 2009), but an increase in the lack of knowledge
about the distribution of payoffs.
The main finding of the paper also relates to previous results on stopping be-
havior under ambiguity, e.g. due to Asano, Okudaira & Sasaki (2011) and Della
Seta, Gryglewicz & Kort (2013). However, the stopping problem analyzed here
is fundamentally different from what has been considered in the literature so far.
First, the final payoff in the experiment of this paper was ex post uncertain, i.e. it
was not known at the time the process was stopped. In a setting with ambiguity
it is important to distinguish this situation, from a setting where payoffs are ex
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post certain, e.g. as in Asano et al. (2011) and Della Seta et al. (2013). In the
given setting, this is not merely a semantic issue. In fact, model predictions about
the direction of an ambiguity effect are exactly opposite across the two settings.
In that sense, the findings in this paper complement the existing evidence on the
effect of ambiguity on wait options. Second, unlike the other mentioned studies
on the effect of ambiguity on stopping behavior, the experiment in this paper
was designed such that the results are also robust to the potential confound of
pessimism that could be induced by ambiguity. Without such an identification
scheme, finding that subjects are more or less reluctant to stop does not neces-
sarily indicate that subjects do not have unique prior beliefs. Third, Della Seta
et al. (2013) investigate the effect of ambiguity about the probability that the
investment opportunity disappears. That is, in their setting, the payoff process
Xt grows deterministically, but jumps to zero with an unknown probability. In
the setting investigated here, there is ambiguity about the drift of the process Xt
whereas the probability that the process jumps to zero is known.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the related litera-
ture. Section 3.3 motivates the underlying theoretical model by a simple example.
Section 3.4 provides the general model setup and provides the central proposition
to be tested. Section 3.5 describes the experimental setup and implementation in
the laboratory. Section 3.6 presents the central results obtained from the statisti-
cal analysis of the data. Section 3.7 finally concludes.
3.2. Related literature
A great number of theoretical models have been developed to rationalize Ellsberg-
type behavior observed in the laboratory (see inter alia Camerer & Weber, 1992;
Mukerji & Tallon, 2004; Gilboa, Postlewaite & Schmeidler, 2008; Etner, Jeleva &
Tallon, 2009; Guidolin & Rinaldi, 2010; Epstein & Schneider, 2010, for extensive
reviews). Many of the existing models were subsequently taken to a dynamic
setting (see e.g. Epstein & Schneider, 2010, for a review).
Theoretical foundations for optimal stopping theory under ambiguous payoff
processes are mainly due to Epstein & Schneider (2003); Nishimura & Ozaki
(2007); Riedel (2009); Cheng & Riedel (2013).1 These authors take the Multiple-
1Earlier foundations are to be found in the mathematical literature on coherent risk measures
(see e.g. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber & Heath, 1999; Riedel, 2004; Föllmer & Schied, 2004) or
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prior Expected Utility (MEU) model of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) as the basic
building block and suitably adapt it to a dynamic context. Despite the widespread
application of optimal stopping models in economic theory, there are relatively few
papers that analyze their descriptive accuracy under risk or ambiguity.
The largest body of literature on optimal stopping tasks in the laboratory comes
from the field of sequential search. For example, Amnon Rapoport and co-authors
in a series of papers, investigated the individual performance of subjects in a
sequential search task experimentally (Rapoport & Tversky, 1966; Kahan et al.,
1967; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970; Seale & Rapoport, 1997). Similarly, there is a
branch of experimental literature putting a focus on testing job search models in
the laboratory, e.g. Schotter & Braunstein (1981); Cox & Oaxaca (1989, 2000).
More recently, Oprea et al. (2009) adapt an experimental design replicating the
theoretical environment motivated by Dixit & Pindyck (1994a). In their paper,
subjects face a risky random walk and have the option to earn its current value
or forego it in favor of future values. They find that subjects approximate the
risk-neutral optimal strategy surprisingly well.
A first paper making a step towards checking the effect of uncertainty on de-
cisions in the laboratory is given by Cox & Oaxaca (2000). In their experiment,
however, participants are endowed with an objective prior over states of the world.
Asano et al. (2011) investigate the descriptive power of the job search model by
Nishimura & Ozaki (2004) when subjects have no prior information about the
distribution of states of the world. Asano et al. (2011) find that observed choices
support Nishimura & Ozaki’s model in the sense that subjects are willing to ac-
cept lower wage offers under ambiguity than under risk. Similarly, Della Seta
et al. (2013) analyze a related situation where subjects do not face a random but
deterministic payoff process and have the option to earn its current value. This
option may cease before execution, however, leaving subjects with zero payoff.
The probability that the investment opportunity expires is ambiguous in their
setting. They find that subjects react to ambiguity by exercising the option later
relative to a control group, indicating ambiguity-seeking behavior.
robust control theory in macroeconomics (Hansen & Sargent, 2001).
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3.3. Motivation through a simple example
This section illustrates the behavioral intuition behind the impact of uncertainty
and uncertainty aversion on the decision to invest. Toward that end, I shall take
the simple two-period two-state example from Nishimura & Ozaki (2007).
To ease exposition, assume a risk-neutral agent, facing an irreversible investment
opportunity. For simplicity, let the one-period discount rate δ be equal zero. Time
is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1. The decision maker contemplates whether to
invest in period t = 0 or in period t = 1 or not at all. In order to seize the
investment opportunity, investment costs K have to be incurred. The immediate
period-0 profit from investing is X0 = x0 < K, which is known with certainty. The
period-1 payoff from the investment X1, however, is uncertain. It either equals xL
or xH , where xH > K > xL and the state H occurs with probability pH .
Since the planning horizon is finite, we may derive the optimal strategy of the
investor using backward induction. In period t = 1, if state H occurs, the decision
maker will choose to invest, because the resulting profit is positive xH−K > 0. If
state L occurs, the decision maker chooses not to invest, because then profits are
negative xL −K < 0. The optimal strategy in period t = 1 is therefore: invest if
the state is H, do not invest otherwise. In period t = 0, the decision maker weighs
the expected payoff from investing in t = 0 against the expected profit from waiting
until t = 1 and behaving optimally from there on. She postpones investment, iff
waiting is profitable in expectation, i.e. if
pH(xH −K)− [x0 −K + (pHxH + (1− pH)xL)] > 0 (3.1)
⇔ (x0 −K) + xL + pH(K − xL) < 0 . (3.2)
The first term in the first line is the continuation value of the option to invest,
anticipating optimal behavior in t = 1. The second term is the stopping value
of the option to invest. By collecting terms, the inequality in the second line
illustrates that the lower the probability for the good state H, the more likely
a decision maker is to postpone investment. Note that this effect is not obvious
a priori, since a reduction in pH affects both, the stopping and the continuation
value, in the same direction.
In a more realistic setting, it seems natural to assume that pH is not perfectly
known to the decision maker. Suppose the decision maker has two possible theories
46
in mind, represented by probabilities pH ∈ {.3, .7}. She has no or very little
objective indication which theory actually prevails. Then if she adopts the theory
that corresponds to pH = 0.3, investment in t = 0 is less likely than with pH = 0.7.
Pessimists are reluctant to invest.
Ambiguity aversion as modeled by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989), postulates that
the decision maker will have such a set of prior beliefs or theories and evaluate
expectations using the measure that is least favorable in terms of expected payoff.
Since this is behaviorally equivalent to a decision maker who holds a unique, but
pessimistic belief in the presence of ambiguity, an identification scheme is needed.
To illustrate the identification scheme put forward here, suppose there are two
possible states of the world, S = {R,B}, and the realization is not observable to
the decision maker. Moreover, suppose the decision maker is not informed about
the objective probability for either R or B. Before the investment decision is to
be made, the decision maker has to bet on either R or B. If the decision maker
predicts the state of the world correctly, the probability for xH will be equal to
pH > 0.5 and 1 − pH < 0.5 otherwise. Under EU, preferences will be based on
beliefs, and subjects will choose the state which they perceive a priori more likely.
Hence, this puts a lower bound of 0.5 on the decision maker’s prior beliefs to have
chosen the true state. Compared with a decision maker that is informed that
p(R) = p(B) = 0.5, the uninformed decision maker is thus supposed to be at least
as optimistic. And based on the simple example above, they are also expected to
stop no later than any subject from the informed group.
To bring this identification to the laboratory, subjects are randomly assigned to
a control group endowed with an objective prior probability for R equal to 0.5 or a
treatment group without objective prior. Before making the investment decision,
subjects are prompted to bet on either R or B. The subsequent evolution of Xt
depends on this bet as described above. Under EU, subjects in the treatment
group are predicted to invest no later than subjects in the control group. The
next section discusses this simple intuition in a more general setting.
3.4. The setting
Assume time is discrete, t = 0, . . . and that the agent observes a sequence {X0 = x0, X1 = x1, . . .}
of realizations of a multiplicative binomial random walk. This means that for a
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given starting value X0 = x0 > 0, future values are drawn recursively as
Xt+1 =
hXt with probability pH1
h
Xt with probability 1− pH
. (3.3)
where in the following h > 1 will be called the step size and pH ∈ [0, 1] the uptick
probability. Let X = {hqX0 : q ∈ Z} be the set off possible states of the process
Xt. Due to the one-to-one relation between upticks q and the level of the process
x, I may represent the set X also by the integer grid Z. Note that since the process
is fully resorbing, the state of the process at time t is fully described by the tuple
(X0, Qt = q), where Qt is the net number of upticks, i.e. upticks minus downticks,
until period t. The uptick probability pH is determined by whether the subject
guesses the state of the world correctly. Before observing the first realization of
the process, the agent has to bet on either state of the world s ∈ {R,B}. Let the
agent’s chosen state be denoted by ι ∈ {R,B}. If ι = s, the uptick probability
pH > 0.5 and otherwise 1 − pH < 0.5. At the end of any period there is a fixed
exogenous probability (1− δ) ∈ [0, 1] that the game ends and the agent receives a
pay-off of zero. I denote by T ≥ 0 the random time the game ends. At any time
t < T before the game ended the agent observes the realization of the random
walk Xt and decides whether to ‘continue’ or to ‘stop’. If she chooses ‘stop’ in
period t the game ends and she receives the future values of the random walk Xt





If the agent chooses ‘continue’, the game ends with probability 1− δ and a pay-off
of zero. If the game does not end in period t, period t + 1 starts and the agent
observes the next realization of the random walk Xt+1.
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3.4.1. The optimization problem of an SEU agent
An expected utility agent’s objective is to maximize










+ 1{τ≥T}u(0) | Q0 = 0
] (3.4)
with respect to the stopping time τ . Here u denotes the strictly increasing and
concave utility function u : [0,∞)→ R and 1{s<T} stands for the indicator function
that takes the value one as long as s < T and zero otherwise. Without loss of
generality, let u(0) = 0.
Denote by V ? : Z→ R the expected utility from stopping when the agent uses
the optimal stopping strategy
V ?(q) = sup
τ
V (τ, q) .
The expectation in Equation (3.4) is evaluated using the one-step ahead poste-
rior belief pt+1|t of the agent after seeing Qt = q net upticks, hence the notation
Eq. The agent is assumed to learn from observing Xt in a Bayesian sense, i.e.
one-step ahead posterior beliefs pt+1|t(q) are formed as
pt+1|t(q) = µ(Qt = q | µ0)pH + (1− µ(Qt = q | µ0))(1− pH) (3.5)











given a prior P(ι = s) = µ0. That is, pt+1|t denotes the agent’s subjective belief
that an uptick will occur in the coming period t + 1, after having seen q upticks
until period t and having prior beliefs µ0. For notational convenience, I will omit
the subscript t+ 1 | t below.
Assumption 4 (Power utility). I assume that the agent is not risk-seeking, that
u is strictly increasing in x and of the power-utility type, i.e.
u(x) = xθ
with 0 < θ ≤ 1.
The agent prefers stopping rule τ over τ ′, if V (τ,X0 = x0) ≥ V (τ ′, X0 = x0).
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As is demonstrated below, there exists a unique, optimal cut-off strategy for the
EU agent.
In order to find the optimal strategy, the following lemma proves to be helpful
Proposition 5 (Stopping Value). The expected utility from stopping after a given






where B(q) = δ
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Armed with a closed-form expression for the stopping value Ω, the optimal
stopping rule that maximizes the objective function (3.4) is found by means of
recursive dynamic programming. Specifically, consider the Bellman equation of
the stopping problem, which equals
V ?(Qt = q) = max {Ω(q), δ E [V ?(Qt+1) | Qt = q]} (3.8)
for every q ∈ Z. For a given function V ?, the optimal stopping rule prescribes to
stop once V ?(τ, q) = Ω(q) and to continue as long as V ?(τ, q) = δE [V ?(Qt+1) | Qt = q].
For notational convenience denote by A the set of values x for which stopping is
optimal, i.e. the set where
Ω(q) ≥ δE [V ?(Qt+1) | Qt = q] .
Because V ? is unknown, it is approximated using value function iteration. To-
ward that end, equation (3.8) is viewed as a functional equation. The right-hand
side defines the operator Ψ: V → V , where V is the space of bounded functions and
(V , d∞) denotes the associated complete metric space equipped with the supre-
mum or uniform metric d∞(V,W ) = supq∈Z d(V (q),W (q)), where d is a metric,
e.g. d1(x, y) = |x− y|, on R.
If I let W ≤ V ? stand for W (q) ≤ V ?(q) for all q ∈ Z. It then holds for Ψ that
Ψ(V ?) = 1{A}Ω(q) + (1− 1{A})δE [V ?(Qt+1) | Qt = q]







































Figure 3.1.: Stopping regions (value = 1) for an agent with θ = .85 and several
priors (left panel) and the behavior of the value function at the origin (q = 0,
µ0 = 0.4) over 500 iterations on the value function (right panel).
Also note that for any k > 0
Ψ(V ? + k) = Ψ (Ω(q) + δE [V ?(Qt+1) + k | Qt = q]) = Ψ(V ?) + δk . (3.10)
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) together imply that Ψ satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions (Stokey, Lucas & Prescott, 1989). Hence, the mapping Ψ is a contrac-
tion with modulus δ < 1, i.e. it holds that for any V0 ∈ V ,
d(Ψn(V0), V
?) ≤ δnd(V0, V ?) .
Consequently, by iterating on the mapping Ψ from any starting point V0 ∈ V , one
will converge to the fixed point V ?, i.e. to the value function underlying (3.8).
Furthermore, the fact that Ψ is a contraction also ensure that the fixed point V
is unique (see Stokey et al., 1989, for a proof).
Since V is a fixed point of Ψ, it may be found recursively by starting with an
initial guess V0 ∈ V and determining every following Vi as
Vi+1 = Ψ(Vi) .
By the Contraction Mapping Theorem, the sequence {Vi} converges uniformly to
V ?.
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Figure 3.1 shows the results from iterating on the value function for a given
parameter constellation until convergence. The left-hand panel depicts the number
of upticks from the starting value against the indicator function 1{A}, where A
again denotes the stopping region. Hence, the stopping region is found to be a
connected set and the boundary of this set moves to the left for increasing prior
belief µ0. Hence, initially more optimistic agents are predicted to stop earlier.
Note that we may find the optimal strategy of an agent with multiple priors
in the same way. An MEU agent possesses a set of prior beliefs M0 on s and
following Epstein & Schneider (2003, 2007), this set of prior beliefs is updated
prior-by-prior according to Bayes rule
Pt+1|t(q) = {µ(Qt = q | µ0) · pH + (1− µ(Qt = q | µ0)) · (1− pH) : µ0 ∈M0} .
(3.11)
Given this sequence of beliefs, the decision maker evaluates future prospects
with respect to all measures in Pt+1|t and then takes the measure that yields
minimal expected utility. In the given setting, the worst case at each point q is
always a future downtick, i.e. the expected payoff of the agent is a monotone
function of the net number of upticks q. To see this, note that posterior beliefs
increase in the number of upticks ∂
∂q








p(q)hθ + (1− p(q))h−θ
]
> 0
because h−θ < hθ under the given assumptions. Consequently, the denominator
in (3.7) is decreasing in q. Since h > 1 the numerator is increasing in q and
therefore q 7→ Ω(q) is increasing. It then also follows that the expected utility
V (τ,Qt = q) from using the stopping strategy τ is increasing in q. Therefore the
worst-case measure p(q) in the set Pt+1|t(q) is always the one associated with the
prior µ
0
∈ M0 that assigns least prior probability to an uptick (see Riedel, 2009,
section 4.2 for a discussion).
It then follows that the optimal strategy for an agent with multiple priors can
be found in the same fashion as under expected utility, where now all expectations
are evaluated using the worst-case one-step ahead probabilities. Hence, for the




The experiment was conducted as a computer-based experiment. The experi-
mental software was programmed using Java and Python and ran in a browser.
Subjects saw two different screens in each of the 45 rounds that they played. Sub-
jects were told that they have the option, but not the obligation, to invest in a
factory, which, upon investment, produces one unit of a fictitious product every
period until the end of the round.
In the laboratory, the experiment was implemented by a series of two alternating
screens (see fig. C.3 and C.4). The first screen prompted subjects to set a color
for the coming round. The screen showed a simple radio button for each color
R and B and subjects had to click a button below to confirm their choice (see
fig. C.3). Subjects were told that the behavior of the process Xt would depend
on whether they met consumers’ taste for the color of the product. There were
two colors available, red (R) and black (B). It was then mentioned that prior
to each round, they would have to set up their machines such that they produce
red or black products, but not both, for the entire round. If the color they chose
matched consumers’ taste, the per-period profits had a 57% chance experiencing
an uptick. If the chosen color did not match consumers taste, the probability for
an uptick was 1 - 0.57 = 0.43 or 43%. The choice for the state-wise probability
for an uptick versus a downtick was largely dictated in order to meet a sweet
spot between the amount of uncertainty and informativeness of the realizations.
First, the greater the difference between pH and 1− pH , the greater the difference
between the respective drifts of the per-period profit processes. For a negligible
difference, the impact of uncertainty is supposed to be negligible as well. Hence,
from an experimental point of view, a larger difference seems desirable in order
to identify an effect. Second, for any value of pH that differs appreciably from
0.5 (by more than 0.05), the drift dominates the process visually. The true state
of the world is then easily discovered after only a few observations. Note that
learning decreases the amount of ambiguity over time and in the limit ambiguity
disappears (Marinacci, 2002, provides a formal argument). Hence, only a small
difference is pertinent to maintain ambiguity for a minimum amount of time.
The second screen presented the actual investment screen. Subjects there saw
the realization of a binomial random walk with parameters mentioned above. The
realizations of the payoff process Xt (measured in ECU) they observed were the
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(potential) per-period profits from selling the product. This process was always
started at the value of 40 ECU (x0 = 40) and the factory investment cost was
fixed at 3,200 ECU. Each second consisted of two ticks (see fig. C.4).
In the control group, subjects were informed that the probability for each color
to be the correct one was 0.5. In the treatment group, instructions were the same
as in the control group, apart from the information concerning the prior probability
for either state of the world. Subjects in the treatment group, were told that the
probability for red to be consumers’ taste was equal to the average relative amount
of rainy days per year in Jakarta (Capital of the Republic of Indonesia).2 Hence,
the probability for a state was linked to a real-world phenomenon, which subjects
might perceive as something that could, in principle, be determined with some
precision. This is in contrast to the original Ellsberg experiment (and variants
thereof), where there is truly no way subjects could know or find out about the
probability for any composition of the ambiguous urn.
A round ended randomly, with a given and constant probability of 0.7% (i.e.
on average t = 1/0.007 ≈ 143 ticks).3
The 45 random walks used in the experiment were the same for every subject.
Based on an individual login (printed on the instructions), the set of 45 random
walks was stratified over 45 rounds.4 The experiment was designed so that for
each subject in the treatment group, there was one subject in the control group
that saw the same sequence over 45 rounds (contingent on choosing the same color
in a given round). This way, a potential ’round effect’ is supposed to be mitigated.
Otherwise subjects might be framed by particularly short/long realizations of the
process in the first few rounds.
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Technical University
Berlin (TU) and the WZB Berlin. The dataset presented here, was obtained from
three laboratory sessions with randomly selected students from the ORSEE pool
of the TU and WZB.5 For each session 22 students from various fields of study
participated in 45 rounds of the experiment for pay. Participants were randomly
2The avg. number of rainy days is roughly equal to 187 days per year, i.e. roughly 50%. See
http://worldweather.wmo.int/043/c00310.htm (Retrieved August 22, 2013).
3A translated version of the instructions is given in the appendix to this paper.
4The login name consists of an initial, "A" or "B", and a two-digit number. The letter prefix
indicates which treatment a subject belongs to, while the two digit number was used as the
seed for a pseudo-random number generator that drew the sequence of series shown. In both
groups, subjects were then numbered in an increasing order.
5See: https://experimente.wzb.eu/
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assigned to either the treatment or the control group. Consequently, each group
currently has 33 subjects with 45 observations each. The average duration of the
experiment was 74 minutes, and the mean earnings for subjects was 15.98 Euros
(median=14 Euros, minimum=5.00 Euros, maximum = 39 Euros).
3.6. Experimental results
This section outlines the results obtained from three laboratory sessions. The
analysis is conducted in view of the central hypothesis derived in terms of the ef-
fect of ambiguity on subjects’ behavior in the investment task. The main finding
is that ambiguity leads subjects in the treatment group to seize the investment
opportunity later than subjects in the control group. This effect is robust un-
der the careful treatment of two key data properties: censoring and unobserved
heterogeneity across subjects.
3.6.1. The effect of ambiguity
Due to the termination hazard, 37% of the observations in the sample are right-
censored. In these cases, the process jumped to zero before a subject decided to
seize the investment. Ignoring this effect in the data leads to a censoring bias in
standard estimators, while dropping censored observations results in a truncated
sample and leads to a truncation bias. In order to handle censoring appropriately,
standard statistical inference has to be adjusted with respect to this.
Nonparametric analysis
Following Oprea et al. (2009); Della Seta et al. (2013), results are first analyzed by
group using a non-parametric Kaplan-Meier or Product-Limit estimator (Kaplan
& Meier, 1958). This estimator focuses on the distribution of the reservation
profit. It estimates the survival function, which is the probability not to invest at
a given value of the profit process. If Nx is the number of subjects who did not
invest at a value of x excluding those for which the process terminated at that
value, and Yx is the number of subjects who invest at a given value of x, then the










Table 3.1.: Mean and median reservation profit by group.
Group No. of events Meana SE Median 95% CIb
Risk group 1017.00 64.28 1.02 41.20 [41.2, 42.44]
Ambiguity group 859.00 72.57 1.10 45.02 [45.02, 46.37]
a Sample size N=2,970 and upper limit where integral under the survival curve is cut off
equals 122.99.
b Confidence interval for the median reservation profit.
The idea behind the Kaplan-Meier estimate is to provide a standard empirical
distribution function of reservation profits x?, taking into account that at various
instances, subjects drop out of the set of subjects that still have the opportunity to
invest. In the absence of censoring, (3.12) coincides with the empirical distribution
function of x.
On the one hand, the Kaplan-Meier estimate provides a way to determine the
direction of the effect of ambiguity, but is less suitable for gauging the magnitude of
the effect. On the other hand, this procedure is truly non-parametric, hence quite
robust against misspecification (e.g. see Therneau & Grambsch, 2000, chapter 2
for an in-depth discussion).
Figure C.1 shows the estimated survival function by group. As shown, the
survival functions for both groups separate in a direction that contradicts the
SEU model prediction. Instead, subjects in the treatment group tend to react
to uncertainty in a way that is predicted by the MEU model. For a given value
of the per-period profit process Xt, subjects in the treatment group have a lower
probability to seize the investment. Note that under the hypothesis that subjects
in the treatment group are SEU maximizer, we would expect the opposite.
One may perform a statistical test for equality of the two cdfs, by means of a
log-rank test (Harrington & Fleming, 1982) with the Nullhypothesis
H0 : S1(x) = S2(x) . (3.13)
The associated statistic is χ2(1) distributed. The value of the statistic is 45.76,
with an associated p-value which is virtually zero.
The impact of uncertainty may be further quantified, by considering the av-
erage reservation profit within each group. Table 3.1 displays the estimates for
the mean and the median reservation profit by group.6 In terms of the median
6The estimate for the mean duration suffers from a bias that stems from the fact that the
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reservation profit, the magnitude of the difference between reservation profits is
less striking and is roughly equal to a 9.3% increase in the reservation wage. The
95% confidence interval around the median shows, however, that the difference is
significant.
Mixed proportional hazard models
In an attempt to gauge the size of the effect on reservation profits, survival or
exponential regression models provide a more adequate tool. There are several
widespread specifications, which mainly differ in the amount of parametric rigor
they impose on the functional form of the hazard function λ(x). The hazard









Hence, the hazard function is the instantaneous probability to invest at a given
value of x. Proportional hazard models assume that the hazard function for indi-
vidual i comprises the baseline hazard function and the risk score. It furthermore
assumes that baseline hazard and risk score are related in a proportional way, i.e.
λ(x) = λ0(x) exp [Yiβ] (3.15)
where yi is the i-th row of the (n×k)-matrix of covariates and exp [Yiβ] is the risk
score. The baseline hazard λ0(π) is treated non-parametrically (see Cox, 1972)
and thus allowed to have any shape, e.g. to be increasing, decreasing or a mixture
of both. An important issue is that in the present case the set of control variables
Yi is very sparse. It only comprises a dummy variable for being a member of
the treatment group. Since no other personal characteristics are observed in the
experiment, it is almost surely the case that there exists a substantial amount of
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. In survival regressions this leads to
inconsistent estimates for the treatment fixed effect β in (3.15), if the heterogeneity
is neglected. Consequently, the basic model (3.15) is extended by incorporating an
individual-specific random effect θ, to absorb the unobserved heterogeneity into
survival function does not become zero over the feasible state space. Consequently, the
integral has to be cut off at the highest censoring value. Comparing median and mean
estimates, the bias seems to be very pronounced in the given case. The estimate of the
median, however, remains unbiased.
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Table 3.2.: Results from mixed proportional hazard model.
coeff. exp(coeff.) SE z-stat. Pr(>|z|)
Ambiguity effect -0.44 0.65 0.23 -1.93 0.05
LR test for random effects −558.06 p: 0.00
Notes: Sample size N=2,970. Efron approximation for ties.
the risk score
λi(x) = λ0(x) exp [Yiβ + Ziθ] . (3.16)
It is assumed here that random effects are normally distributed
θ ∼ N(0, σ2In) . (3.17)
The model (3.16) to (3.17) may be estimated using penalized regression methods
(see Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990; Therneau, 2003).
Results from the Cox model with Gaussian frailties are given in table 3.2. The
results may be easily interpreted in terms of the relative risk score, which is the
probability for a subject to invest at a given value x, relative to a subject in the
control group. Note that conditional on θ the relative hazard for a member of






= exp [(Y1 − Y0)β] = exp [β] . (3.18)
Table 3.2 then reveals that the conditional relative risk score is 0.65, i.e. given
the individual frailty term, ambiguity reduces the probability to invest at a given
level by around 35%. However, the effect is borderline significant (p = 0.05). The
results also show that the variance of the random effect is significantly larger than
zero, as confirmed by an LR test with the null hypotheses that the variance of the
frailty effect is zero.7
The overall results illustrate the importance to take into consideration the pres-
ence of individual heterogeneity that is due to unobserved factors.
7A Cox model without frailties was also estimated. In such a model, the treatment effect
was significant at a 2.5% level and the relative risk score was 0.75. The proportionality
assumption (3.15), however, was strongly rejected, as indicated by the scaled Schoenfeld
residuals.
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3.6.2. The effect of ambiguity over time
From a theoretical perspective, there is room for learning not only within a given
round, but also between rounds. By observing the payoff process over rounds,
subjects update their belief about the probability for either state of the world.
Therefore subjects may also learn about the true probability for each state, even
though the true state is never revealed to them.
Again, the results will be analyzed by means of non-parametric estimation of
the survival function and mixed proportional hazard models. Figure C.5 shows the
survival functions across groups for different blocks of rounds. Going from the top
left panel to the bottom right panel, different blocks of ten rounds are analyzed
in isolation. To allow subjects to accommodate to the experiment, the first five
rounds were discarded and all subsequent rounds were divided into blocks of ten.
The depicted survival curves in Figure C.5 show very much the same pattern as
the overall survival curve across all 45 rounds displayed in Figure C.1. Going from
the first to the last block, the effect of ambiguity seems very persistent. The dif-
ference in the survival curves, as measured by the 95% confidence bands, remains
significant for the most parts of the relevant range. Moreover, even though the
difference between the survival functions becomes insignificant for higher values
of x, the direction of the effect never reverses into the direction implied by SEU.
The same conclusion derives from the mixed proportional hazard models, when
estimated using the same subsamples of data. Tables C.1 to C.4 show the estima-
tion results for the block of rounds mentioned before. Interestingly, the treatment
effect of being in the ambiguity group gets stronger over the first three blocks
until round 35. In the block that includes all decisions from rounds 25 to 35, the
probability to invest at a given level of the profit process Xt is only 60% of that
of a subject in the risk group. For the first three blocks, the treatment effect is
always significant at the 5% level. For the last block of rounds, i.e. from rounds
35 to 45, the effect becomes insignificant and smaller in magnitude. This might
be due to the fact that subjects the situation as less ambiguous over time, but
it may also result from subjects’ fatigue as the final rounds were usually taking
place after around 60 minutes of play.
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3.7. Conclusion
This paper considers the impact of ambiguity on irreversible investment decisions
in the laboratory. The main finding of this paper is that laboratory data lends
support to the prediction made by the multiple-prior expected utility model, as
opposed to the prediction made by subjective expected utility. That is, despite
the fact that subjects were given the choice to bet on either state of the world at
the first stage of the experiment, they behave as if the chosen state had minimal
chance to occur at the second stage of the experiment. A non-parametric analysis
of observed reservation profits reveals that subjects in the treatment group have
a 9% higher median reservation profit than subjects in the control group. A
regression-based analysis across groups that controls for unobserved heterogeneity
shows that subjects in the treatment group are 35% less likely than subjects from
the control group to seize the investment at a given level of the payoff process.
The effect is very persistent and statistically significant over more than thirty
repetitions of the same stopping task.
These results indicate that uncertainty plays a role for an individual’s decision to
pledge a safe payoff in favor of an uncertain future payoff. Subjects in the labora-
tory ask for a higher reservation profit to forgo a safe endowment for an uncertain
investment. This for examples may serve as empirical foundation for theoretical
finance models of investment behavior and portfolio choice when investors are face
ambiguity and are ambiguity averse. Models with ambiguity averse decision mak-
ers models are able to explain a range of common findings with respect to financial
markets and investors’ behavior, that are hard to reconcile with standard choice
theory, such as non-participation or selective participation, portfolio inertia and
non-continuous price moves in changes in fundamentals. Consequently, investors
may avoid taking or even completely close positions as market conditions become
more uncertain. Thus, market liquidity of certain asset classes may erode sud-
denly as a response to heightened ambiguity. The results obtained here indicate
that it may happen due to heightened uncertainty without any increase in funda-
mental volatility or decrease in risk-appetite. This is even more striking, because
the amount of ambiguity and complexity in the experiment may be considered
as fairly small compared to real-world situations. Consequently, it seems possible
that the estimated effect in this paper understates potential ambiguity premium
in real-world investment decisions.
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From a macroeconomic perspective, the experimental results also lend support
to an uncertainty effects à la Bloom (2009). Such models argue that private
households and firms react to heightened volatility by postponing investment,
because the option value of waiting increases in volatility. Much along the lines
of Ilut & Schneider (2010), the results from the laboratory suggest that the same
reaction is triggered by an increase in ambiguity Insofar, the experimental results
may be viewed as providing a microfoundation for models that incorporate the
effect of ambiguity on investment through modeling representative households




A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1. Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Define the running maximum St = maxs≤tXs. Note that
P [τ(b) < T |X0 = x] = P [ST ≥ b |X0 = x] .
For all x < b, the probability of reaching the level b from period-0 perspective, is
equal to the probability of reaching the next period, T > 1, times the expected
probability of reaching b from period-1 perspective, i.e.
P [ST ≥ b |X0 = x] =P[T > 1]E [P [ST ≥ b | X1, T > 1] | X0 = x]
=δ
(
pP [ST ≥ b | X1 = xh, T > 1]
+ (1− p)P
[




pP [ST ≥ b | X0 = xh] + (1− p)P
[
ST ≥ b | X0 = xh−1
])
.
To simplify notation define ψb(x) = P [ST ≥ b |X0 = x] = ψb(x). By definition ψb
is a solution to the difference equation
ψb(x) =
1 for all x ≥ bδ (pψb(xh) + (1− p)ψb(xh−1)) for all x < b , (A.1)
taking values in [0, 1]. If we have two solutions ψb, ψ̂b of Equation A.1 it holds
that
|ψb(x)− ψ̂b(x)| = 1{x<b}δ






As ψb(x), ψ̂b(x) lie between zero and one, the supremum of the differences supz |ψb(z)−
ψ̂b(z)| exists and is bounded by one. As δ < 1 it follows that
sup
z
|ψb(z)− ψ̂b(z)| ≤ δ sup
z
|ψb(z)− ψ̂b(z)| = 0
and thus Equation A.1 can have at most one solution taking values in [0, 1].
Guessing the solution of (A.1) to be of the form ψb(x) = 1{x<b}(xb )
α +1{x≥b} gives
1 = δ (phα + (1− p)h−α) . Substituting z = hα yields the quadratic equation
0 = δ
(
pz + (1− p)z−1
)














By symmetry this equation has two solution of the form z, z−1. Let z > 1 be the
larger solution. For the smaller solution, 1
z






Hence, the resulting function ψ(x) = 1{x<b}(xb )
α + 1{x≥b} is decreasing in x and
takes values outside [0, 1]. This leads to a contradiction and shows that α > 1.
Note that the function z 7→ δ (pz + (1− p)z−1) is increasing for all z ≥ 1. By
Assumption 1, δ (ph+ (1− p)h−1) < δ (pz + (1− p)z−1) = 1 and thus 1 ≤ h <
z = hα and α > 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2 the expected value of any cut-off strategy with
cut-off b = x0hn is given by
V (τ(x0h





If u is concave Γ is monotone decreasing (as it follows by setting κ = 0 in the
proof of Lemma 7). As Γ(bu) < 0 it follows from the monotonicity of Γ that τ(bu)
is the optimal cut-off strategy. Denote by x > bu the point where Lu(x−K) > 0.
Clearly, as it not optimal to stop at x if the optimal strategy is a cut-off strategy
the optimal cut-off b must be greater x. As x > bu this is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1 Lu(bu−K) < 0. Thus,
if Lu changes its sign at most once this implies Assumption 2. In the final step we
show for constant absolute or relative risk-aversion Lu changes its sign at most
once.
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion: Suppose the agent accepts such a gamble at
the wealth level x. Let u(x) = −1
θ
exp(−θx), i.e. assume the agent has constant
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absolute risk-aversion of θ. The expected change in utility from waiting one more
round at x equals




















pe−θx(h−1) + (1− p)e−θx(h−1−1)
)
+ (1− δ)eθ(x−K) − 1
]
We will show that the second part is monotone increasing in x. Taking derivatives
of the term in square brackets gives
δ
(
− θ(h− 1)pe−θx(h−1) + θ(1− h−1)(1− p)eθx(1−h−1)
)
+ (1− δ)θeθ(x−K)


















Where the last step follows as hp+h−1(1−p) < 1 by Assumption 1. Consequently
Lu changes its sign at most once.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion: Let u(x) = (x+K)
θ−Kθ
θ
. The expected change in
utility from waiting one more round at x equals
Lu(x−K) = δ
θ









p(xh)θ + (1− p)(xh−1)θ
]





















phθ + (1− p)h−θ
)
= p log(h)hθ − (1− p) log(h)h−θ ≥ p log(h)(hθ − h−θ) ≥ 0 .
Thus, phθ + (1− p)h−θ < phα + (1− p)h−α = 1
δ
for all θ < α, by definition of α.
As 1
θ
xθ is increasing in x this completes the proof.

B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1. Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 8. First, we derive the probability that the maximum of the pro-
cess is at least y ∈ X
P [ST ≥ y | Xt = x, St = s] =
1 if s ≥ yP [τ(y) < T | Xt = x] if s < y
Hence, we have that the probability that the maximum of the process is exactly
y ∈ X for all s < y equals


















Let b = xhm. Given the regret functional derived in equation 1.6 the expected
value of using the cut-off strategy τ(b) equals
V (τ(b), x, s) = E
[
1{τ(b)<T}u(Xτ(b) −K)− κu(Sτ(b) −K) | Xt = x, St = s
]












































































































































































Figure B.1.: Shows the observed reservation levels for over rounds as played
by subjects. Each panel in a given block of panels is the sequence of reservation
levsls for one subject.
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Figure B.3.: Posterior distribution of κ by subject. Dashed vertical lines de-
pict the 95% interval.
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B.3. Implementation in R
This section provides the code used for estimation of the stochastic choice model
with the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2012).
B.3.1. Functions
Let us first provide some basic functions that we will use for estimating the model.
# Utility function
utils <- function(x, theta) {
# utility function for CRRA u(x - K) equals:
u <- ((x/K)^theta - 1) * (K/theta)
return(u)
}
# Computes the Stopping value
sv.crra <- function(x, s, theta, k) {
# computes the stopping value at a given point (x,s) for a
# given parameter (theta,k).
stop.val <- utils(x, theta) - k * utils(s, theta)
return(stop.val)
}
con.val <- function(y, s, theta, kappa, steps, z, K, h) {
theta <- theta
k <- kappa
xhi <- outer(array(y, length(y)), h^(0:steps), FUN = "*")
u.xhi <- apply(xhi, 2, utils, theta)
zs <- z^(0:steps)
immediate <- t(apply(u.xhi, 1, function(x) x * zs))
tmp <- immediate
if (k > 0) {
benchmark <- utils(s, theta)
uvss <- t(sapply(1:length(y), function(x) pmax(benchmark[x],
u.xhi[x, ])))
interim <- k * (1 - z) * (t(apply(t(apply(uvss, 1, function(x) x *
zs)), 1, cumsum)))
reach <- k * t(apply(uvss, 1, function(x) zs * x))
tmp <- immediate - interim - reach
}




cv.crra <- function(x, s, theta, k) {
# Expected utility from waiting one more period and
# continuing with the optimal cut-off strategy from there
tmp <- cbind(x, s, seq_along(x))
df1 <- unique(tmp[, 1:2])
conval <- delta * ((p * (df1[, 1] < df1[, 2])) * con.val(h *
df1[, 1], df1[, 2], theta, k, 120, z, K, h) + p * (df1[,
1] == df1[, 2]) * con.val(h * df1[, 1], h * df1[, 2],
theta, k, 120, z, K, h) + (1 - p) * con.val(df1[, 1]/h,
df1[, 2], theta, k, 120, z, K, h)) - (1 - delta) * (k *
utils(df1[, 2], theta))
df2 <- cbind(df1, conval)
ContinuationValue <- merge(tmp, df2, by = c("x", "s"))
return(ContinuationValue[order(ContinuationValue[, 3]), 4])
}
# Next retrieve the stopping decisions from the data.
# Retrieve (i) whether or not stopping occurred and (ii) in
# which period stopping occurred.
Get.stopping.decisions <- function(Y) {
abb <- array(, c(65, 3)) # vector of stopping decisions, 0 did not stop, 1 stopped.
for (j in 1:65) {
abb[j, 1] <- ifelse(Y$invested[Y$rowIndex == (j - 1)] ==
TRUE, 1, 0)
abb[j, 2] <- ifelse(Y$invested[Y$rowIndex == (j - 1)] ==
TRUE, Y$investmentIdx[Y$rowIndex == (j - 1)] + 1,
sum(!is.na(series[j, ])))
abb[j, 3] <- ifelse(Y$invested[Y$rowIndex == (j - 1)] ==
TRUE, data$investmentValue, NA)
}
return(list(abb = abb[, 1], dec = abb[, 2], lev = abb[, 3]))
}
prior <- function(Theta, prior) {






a <- dnorm(theta, mean = m.theta, sd = s.theta, log = TRUE)
b <- dunif(tremble, min = 0, max = 1, log = TRUE)
c <- 1/sigma
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if (sigma == 0) {
c <- -Inf
}
out <- a + b + c
}







a <- dnorm(theta, mean = m.theta, sd = s.theta, log = TRUE)
b <- dunif(tremble, min = 0, max = 1, log = TRUE)
c <- dunif(kappa, min = 0, max = 1, log = TRUE)
d <- 1/sigma
if (sigma == 0) {
c <- -Inf
}




LLF <- function(Theta, data, prior) {
Theta <- Theta * parFac
if (length(Theta) == 4) {
Lower <- c(1e-05, 0, 0, 0)
Upper <- c(alpha - 0.001, 1, 1e+06, 1)
penFac <- 1 + sum(pmax(0, Lower - Theta)^1.1) + sum(pmax(0,
Theta - Upper)^1.1)





cat("theta =", round(c(theta), digits = 4), "kappa = ",
c(round(kappa, digits = 4)), "sigma = ", round(sigma,
4), "tremble = ", c(round(tremble, digits = 4)))
}
if (length(Theta) == 3) {
Lower <- c(1e-05, 0, 0)
Upper <- c(alpha - 0.001, 1e+06, 1)
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penFac <- 1 + sum(pmax(0, Lower - Theta)^1.1) + sum(pmax(0,
Theta - Upper)^1.1)





cat("theta =", round(c(theta), digits = 4), "kappa = ",
c(round(kappa, digits = 4)), "sigma = ", round(sigma,






for (k in 1:65) {
x.t <- 40 * h^process[k, 1:(dec[k]), 1]
s.t <- 40 * h^process[k, 1:(dec[k]), 2]
CV <- cv.crra(x.t, s.t, theta, kappa)
SV <- sv.crra(x.t, s.t, theta, kappa)
Q <- CV - SV
T <- length(Q)
tmp <- ifelse(abb[k] == 1, sum(log((1 - tremble) * pnorm(Q[1:(T -
1)], mean = 0, sd = sigma) + tremble)) + log((1 -
tremble) * pnorm(-Q[T], mean = 0, sd = sigma)), sum(log((1 -
tremble) * pnorm(Q[1:T], mean = 0, sd = sigma) +
tremble)))
Likelihood <- tmp + Likelihood
}
Log.like <- Likelihood + prior(Theta, prior)
cat(" =>", Log.like, "\n")
return(Log.like * penFac)
}
Note that is is straightforward to change the code for the log-likelihood of the
model to go from a model for each subject to a pooled model.1
1For a larger subject pool or larger number if iterations, e.g. for Monte-Carlo exercises, the com-
putationally heavy parts of the code could be outsourced using the C++ interface provided
by the Rcpp package (Eddelbuettel & Francois, 2011; Eddelbuettel, 2013) and the header
files to use the linear algebra environment Armadillo from the R package RcppArmadillo
(Eddelbuettel & Sanderson, 2014).
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B.3.2. Pre-estimation: Finding posterior modes
First, given the data from the laboratory experiment, we set up an item that
contains the different random walks Xt together with the running maximum St
and the number of times the value of Xt occurred before.
process <- array(, c(65, 504, 4))
for (i in 1:65) {
for (j in 1:504) {
tmp <- series[i, 1:j]
process[i, j, ] <- c((log(series[i, j]) - log(40))/log(1.06),
max((log(series[i, 1:j]) - log(40))/log(1.06)), ifelse(is.na(tmp[j]),
NA, length(tmp[tmp == tmp[j]])), NA)
tmp2 <- process[i, 1:j, 1:2]
process[i, j, 4] <- sum(sapply(1:ifelse(j == 1, 1, dim(tmp2)[1]),
function(x) {
if (j == 1) {
all(tmp2[x] == tmp2[j])
} else {





colnames(process) <- c("x", "s", "multiplicity x", "multiplicity xs")
Next we define some global variables that we set for the experiment and that








Using these primitive parameters, we calculate some secondary parameters, e.g.
the term α in the probability to reach a certain level of the process
p1 <- 1/(2 * delta * p)
q1 <- (1 - p)/p




if (alpha < 1) {
stop("\n\n\t -- alpha is smaller than 1, but it must be larger! -- \n")
}
To find a starting value for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, we find the
posterior mode of the individual posteriors using the optim command (mind the




MLE <- function(i, sp, prior) {
hyperpars <- prior
parFac <<- pmax(0.01, abs(sp))
mle <- optim(sp/parFac, fn = LLF, method = "BFGS", data = data[data$individuals ==
i, ], prior = hyperpars, control = list(fnscale = -1))
if (1) {
cat("Restart at first optimum -- try to refine solution\n")
sp <- mle$par * parFac
parFac <<- pmax(0.01, abs(sp))
mle <- optim(sp/parFac, fn = LLF, method = "Nelder-Mead",
data = data[data$individuals == i, ], prior = hyperpars,
control = list(fnscale = -1))
}






res.EU <- clusterApplyLB(cl = clust, x = 1:44, fun = MLE, sp = c(1,
5, 0.65), prior = c(0.7, 0.3))
laufzeit <- proc.time() - ptm
ptm <- proc.time()
res.Regret <- clusterApplyLB(cl = clust, x = 1:44, fun = MLE,
sp = c(0.7, 0.1, 5, 0.65), prior = c(0.7, 0.3))
laufzeit2 <- proc.time() - ptm
2We parallelized computations across several CPU cores using the package parallel in R. This
package allows to spawn child processes of R that perform computations simultaneously.
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The objects res.EU and res.Regret are nested lists which contain the returned
lists from optim. The maxima returned by optim are handed over as starting
values for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in the next step.
B.3.3. Estimation: Posterior simulation via the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
As was mentioned, we take the posterior modes for each subject and pass it on
to the function that performs posterior simulation. Posterior simulation is done




MH <- function(i, prior) {
hyperpars <- prior
parFac <<- 1
par <- posterior.modes[, i]
mha <- Metro_Hastings(LLF, par, adapt_par = c(100, 100, 0.5,
0.75), data = data[data$individuals == i, ], prior = hyperpars,
iterations = 5000, burn_in = 1000)
return(mha)
}
posterior.modes <- unlist(sapply(1:44, function(x) res.EU[[x]]$par))
# Export EU results to cluster
clusterExport(clust, c(ls()))
# Do MCMC for EU model
metro.EU <- clusterApplyLB(cl = clust, x = 1:44, fun = MH, prior = c(0.7,
0.3))
posterior.modes <- unlist(sapply(1:44, function(x) res.Regret[[x]]$par))
# Export EU results to cluster
clusterExport(clust, c(setdiff(ls(), "metro.EU")))
# Do MCMC for EU model
metro.Regret <- clusterApplyLB(cl = clust, x = 1:44, fun = MH,
prior = c(1, 1, 0.5, 100), prior.class = "GH", pref.class = "R")
# Inherit the workspace to each node
C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5. The expected utility from stopping after Qτ = q upticks is
given as








In order to find a closed-form for the latter part of Ω, let






























= hθW (q − 1) .
Consequently, W is a first-order difference equation and its solution is of the form
W (q) = βhθq , (C.1)
where β is a parameter that has to be determined by an additional condition. To
find the value for β, note that the expected utility from stopping at Qτ = q is the
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sum of the current utility from stopping u(x0hq) plus the expected sum of future
utilities, i.e.
W (q) = u(x0h









1− δ [p(q)hθ + (1− p(q))h−θ]
.
Collecting the results, we find that
Ω(q) = −Kθ + h
θqxθ0

















Survival function for both groups
risk
ambiguity
Figure C.1.: Estimate of the survival function by group. The dashed vertical
line indicates the initial value of the payoff process.
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Figure C.2.: Boxplots of observed reservation profits over 45 rounds by
subject.
Figure C.3.: Screen for color choice (in German).
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Figure C.4.: Investment screen (in German).
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Survival function for rounds  5 to 15
risk
ambiguity













Survival function for rounds  15 to 25
risk
ambiguity













Survival function for rounds  25 to 35
risk
ambiguity













Survival function for rounds  35 to 45
risk
ambiguity
Figure C.5.: Estimate of the survival function by group and over blocks of
rounds. Standard errors are not clustered by subject but lower limit is modified
based on an "effective n" argument. The extra width is obtained by multiplying
the usual variance by a factor m/n, where n is the number currently at risk
and m is the number at risk at the last death time (see reference manual of




Table C.1.: Results from mixed proportional hazard model for rounds 5 to 15.
coeff. exp(coeff.) SE z-stat. Pr(>|z|)
Ambiguity effect -0.42 0.66 0.19 -2.15 0.03
LR test for random effects −76.76 p: 0.00
Notes: Sample size N=728. Efron approximation for ties.
Table C.2.: Results from mixed proportional hazard model for rounds 15 to
25.
coeff. exp(coeff.) SE z-stat. Pr(>|z|)
Ambiguity effect -0.46 0.63 0.22 -2.10 0.04
LR test for random effects −105.14 p: 0.00
Notes: Sample size N=726. Efron approximation for ties.
Table C.3.: Results from mixed proportional hazard model for rounds 25 to
35.
coeff. exp(coeff.) SE z-stat. Pr(>|z|)
Ambiguity effect -0.51 0.60 0.24 -2.15 0.03
LR test for random effects −131.18 p: 0.00
Notes: Sample size N=726. Efron approximation for ties.
Table C.4.: Results from mixed proportional hazard model for rounds 35 to
45.
coeff. exp(coeff.) SE z-stat. Pr(>|z|)
Ambiguity effect -0.33 0.72 0.24 -1.35 0.18
LR test for random effects −116.04 p: 0.00
Notes: Sample size N=660. Efron approximation for ties.
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C.3. Instructions
Seat number: A-22 
Welcome! 
Please read these instructions carefully.  
Please remain seated during the whole experiment. Do not communicate with any other participant 
and remain calm. 
 
Should you have questions regarding the experiment or the instructions, please raise your hand and 
one of the Experimentators will come to your place.  
 
After you have finished the experiment, please also remain seated. Also please do not log out of the 
computer-based experiment before we have paid you.  
 
The experiment today consists of 45 rounds in which you will have to make one decision each. After you 
have finished all 45 rounds, we will pay you a 7 Euro show-up fee plus the amount of points that you 
have earned in ONE randomly determined round. 
Points are converted to Euros according to the simple formula: 
You complete payoff in EUR = 0.002*(No. of points earned in ECU) + 7.00 EUR Show-up fee. 
Which of the 45 rounds will be used to determine your payoff is completely random. The computer will 
draw with equal probability a number between 1 and 45 to determine your payoff. The result will be 
displayed on a final screen. 
  
The basic idea 
In this experiment you will decide when (if ever) to invest into a factory. In case you decide to invest into 
the factory in a given round, the factory produces a fictitious good. You earn proceeds from selling this 
product over time. In each round you are endowed with 3,200 ECU. Investment into the factory involves 
fixed cost (for building the factory) of 3,200 ECU. These costs only have to be incurred once. 
In each of the 45 rounds you will play, you may only invest into the factory once, not multiple times. 
You may earn more than your initial endowment from your investment into the factory. You may, 
however, also earn LESS than your initial endowment. 





As you can see from the picture, there are three buttons available to you. To begin a given round, click 
on the button “Begin round”. As soon as you have clicked this button, the computer will start to display 
the evolution of potential profits from selling the product. Every second there are two ticks. The starting 
value is always 40. From there on, profits rise or fall from their previous value by 3%. Assume that the 
current value is equal to 100. The next value will then be either 100*1.03 = 103 or it will be  
100*(1/1,03)  ≈ 97,09. 
As you can also see in the picture above, the computer displays the evolution of profits as a jagged blue 
line. On the horizontal axis time in seconds is depicted. The vertical axis depicts the last value of the 
profit process in ECU.  The current value of the profit process is the right-most tip of the blue line (in the 
picture above it is equal to 33.5 ECU). There is additional information about the current round, 
summarized in the red box at the right-hand side of the screen. 
As soon as you have started a round, you may seize the investment by clicking the button „Invest“. 
Pressing „Invest“ has two immediate consequences: (i) you have to incur the investment cost of 3,200 
ECU and your account balance drops to zero and (ii) you will earn the sum of all current and future 
profits until the end of the round. For example, suppose you invest in the situation depicted in Fig. 1. In 
that case, you would immediately earn the current value 33.5 ECU plus all future values until the end of a 
round. To highlight this, the jagged line will turn green from the point where you invested. 
In case, you decide not to invest in a given round, your final payoff will be zero ECU. In case you invested 
in a given round, your final payoff equals the sum of profits earned after investment.  
How long a round lasts is RANDOM. Consequently, the payoff you are able to earn from your investment 
is random. The computer will determine prior to each period, i.e. twice every second, whether a round 
ends or not. There is a constant and fixed probability of 0.7% that a round ends after a given period. You 
notice a round has ended once the computer stopped extending the jagged line and no new value is 
depicted. 
With the end of a round you will also lose your option to investment into the factory, unless you have 
done so before. If you invested before, the end of the round means also that you stop earning profits 
from your investment.   
Therefore on the one hand you should not hesitate too long to invest, should you be convinced that 
investment is profitable. On the other hand you should not invest prematurely, in case you feel you 
cannot gauge the risk of the investment. 
As soon as a given round has ended, the button “Next round” is activated and you may proceed to the 
next round.   
Details 
How much you will earn from selling you are the product produces by the factory, depends on whether 
or not you happen to match consumers‘ preference for the COLOR OF THE PRODUCT. There are two 
possible colors for the product: RED or BLACK. Prior to each round, the computer randomly determines 
which color is the preferred color of consumers. You will not be informed about the outcome. The 
factory is only able to produce goods of a particular color, not both at the same time.  
Before the start of each round, you will have to fix which color machines will be producing. After you 
have fixed the setup, it cannot be changed during a round. You may only change it between rounds. In 
case you guess the preferred color correctly, it is more likely that the profits from selling the product will 
rise over time. Conversely, in the case you did not guess the preferred color correctly, it will be more 
likely that profits fall over time.  
More precisely: 
 In case you guess the preferred color correctly, profits will have a 57% chance to increase by 3% 
and decrease with 43% chance by 3% each tick. 
 
 In case you guess the preferred color correctly, profits will have a 43% chance to increase by 3% 
and decrease with 57% chance by 3% each tick. 
As mentioned before, the computer determines the preferred color for each round separately. The 
preferred color is RED with probability q and BLACK with probability 1 – q.  
 
TEXT FOR AMBIGUITY (TREATMENT) GROUP: 
You do not have any further information about what the probability q exactly is. All you know is that it 
equals the average share of rainy days over a year in Jakarta (Capital of the Republic of Indonesia). That 
is, the more often it rains in Jakarta, the more likely it is that the preferred color will be RED. 
For example, suppose the average number of rainy days in Jakarta within a year is 251 days. Then q 
would equal 251 divided by 365 or roughly 68%. If the average number of rainy days in Jakarta was 116 
days, q would equal 116 divided by 365 or roughly 32%. If you are convinced that it is more likely that 
RED will be the preferred color, you should choose to set your machines to produce red products. 
Conversely, if you are more convinced BLACK will be the preferred color, you should choose to your 
machines to produce black products. 
 
TEXT FOR RISK (CONTROL) GROUP: 
You know that q is equal to 0.5 or 50%. 
 
Summary 
To wrap it up again: 
- You will have to make investment decision over the course of 45 rounds. 
 
- Investing into the factory may earn you more than the initial building cost, but it also bears the 
risk of earning you less than the initial building cost. 
 




Should you have no further questions regarding the experiment, please switch on 
the computer screen in front of you and log into the experiment. Your login is 
equal to your seat number, please confirm your entry with the button “Login”. 
Please note that your login is case sensitive. You also have to include a minus sign 
between the initial letter and your number.  
Your seat number is: A-22.  
 
The experiment will then start with the choice for the color for the first round. 
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